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RESPECTING FOUNDATION AND CHARITY AUTONOMY:
HOW PUBLIC IS PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY?*
EVELYN BRODY** AND JOHN TYLER***
FORWARD: GROUNDING THE DEBATE
From Colonial times Americans have debated the role of philanthropy
and the charitable sector in our social and political economy. These de-
bates, while they can never be definitively resolved, are a healthy reflection
of the diversity and plurality of views about the relative roles of the gov-
ernmental, business, and nonprofit sectors. Recent years, however, have
seen a disturbing increase in legal proposals or demands by certain mem-
bers of the public and the government to interfere with the governance,
missions, strategies, and decision-making of foundations and other chari-
ties. The debate has included calls for legislation to limit the number or
characteristics of directors serving on nonprofit boards and calls to subju-
gate charitable purposes as determined by donors and charity boards to
broad mandates addressing social justice and other mission-oriented issues.
Underlying much of these debates is the premise-stated or merely
presumed-that foundation and charity assets are "public money" and that
such entities therefore are subject to various public mandates or standards
about their missions, operations, and decision-making. To the extent these
assumptions are expressed, they are grounded on charities' public purposes,
on the authority of the state to recognize the legal status of nonprofit or-
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ganizations, and on the tax-exempt status of charities and the deductibility
of contributions to them. The ultimate outcome of such perspectives is an
absence of principled limits on the right of the public to direct philanthro-
pies and their resources.
As we have both participated in and observed the various debates, we
and others wondered about the accuracy of the framework upon which the
debates were grounded. We also realized that a comprehensive understand-
ing of this framework had not been undertaken and that such an exegesis
was necessary to ensure the proper context for legitimate debate on issues
important to the sector and to its relationships to the governmental and
business sectors. After all, an inaccurate context could inadvertently cause
substantial harm to and disrupt the balance that voluntary organizations
provide to our civil society and our economic and social systems. The po-
tential consequences are too significant for the underlying debates not to be
framed in an accurate context.
As such, this article does not purport to address the substantive areas
of debate. Instead, it is concerned more narrowly with the underlying
framework and the legal authority of the government and the public to im-
pose restrictions on the governance, mission, and decision-making of pri-
vate foundations and other charities. Specifically, the deceptively simple
yet admittedly ambitious goal of this article is to examine the validity of the
claim sometimes made--or even just assumed-that intrusions on philan-
thropic autonomy and independence are justified on the ground that chari-
table assets are "public money." In general, this article does not claim on
behalf of foundations and other charities, "You can't do this to us," but
rather, more modestly, "You can't do this to us on the basis that we are
public agencies or that our assets are public."
Our experiences and research reveal three arguments that, singly or
collectively, underlie claims that charitable assets are public money. The
first argument conceives of foundations and other charities as "shadow
governments" due to the requirement that they have public purposes and
are subject to attorney general parens patriae oversight. The second argu-
ment asserts that, because philanthropies exist under state charters, they are
government agencies, "state actors," or quasi-public bodies subject to con-
stitutional constraints or accountable to the public in the same way as is
government. The third argument asserts that revenue forgone on deductible
charitable contributions and the tax exemption are a contribution from the
state that endows the state or the public with a say in nonprofit governance
structure, operations and decision-making. Of course, these positions over-
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lap-and cumulate-and so the discussion below is necessarily inter-
twined.
In seeking to understand and consider each of these three arguments,
this article explores numerous legal precedents, theories, and policies, in-
cluding those that recognize the importance of philanthropic autonomy to
our pluralistic society and culture and the various positions that threaten to
undermine that autonomy. Ultimately, we conclude by emphasizing the
covenant that foundations and other charities-as private, independent,
autonomous enterprises-make to pursue and serve purposes that are chari-
table and worthy of exemption in their grant-making, operational programs,
management, and governance. At the same time, foundations and other
charities are not inherently public agencies or bodies, and their assets are
not and should not be subject to broad-based government or public control.
In its focus on premises and assumptions, this article seeks to re-ground the
debates and put an end to misuse of the phrase "public money."
INTRODUCTION: IS TERMINOLOGY DESTINY?
The charitable sector finds itself in a confusing semantic moment in
time, with consequences for the critical but delicate balance that distin-
guishes this sector from the government and for-profit sectors. The seman-
tic confusion originates with application of the word "public" to the
sector-particularly as applied to grant-making foundations, including use
of such phrases as the following: "it's the public's money" or "public bene-
fit" or "for the public trust." These phrases and others are being invoked as
justification for increasing intrusion by the public/government sector across
the lines that separate the state from the charitable sector, thereby en-
croaching on that critical balance.'
Indeed, the charitable sector in the United States has long suffered in
the court of public opinion due to a lack of a satisfactory term to describe
itself. For at least the last forty years, in the lead-up to and adoption of the
Tax Reform Act of 1969, no single term as emerged to refer to these essen-
tial participants in our society. English law does not share our terminologi-
1. For example, in 2008, Republican Governor Matt Blunt of Missouri tried to compel a private
Missouri foundation to use 80 percent of its grant budget to support underfunded state health care
programs. "There is a strong argument," he explained, "that those assets right belong to Missouri tax-
payers." Editorial, Friday Editorial: Yours, Mine, and His, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, May 29, 2008,
at C8 (quoting Letter from Matt Blunt, Governor of Missouri, to the Missouri Foundation for Health
(May 27, 2008)), available at http://www.stltoday.com/blogzone/the-platform/published-
editorials/2008/05/friday-editorial-yours-mine-and-his/. See also Maureen Glabman, Health Plan
Foundations: How Well Are They Spending the Money?, MANAGED CARE MAGAZINE, August, 2008, at
16, available at http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/0808/0808.foundations.htm (last visited
Feb. 22, 2009).
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cal hesitation, having called these entities charities since even before the
Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601. Indeed, U.S. trust law has carried over
this terminology, distinguishing between private trusts and charitable trust.
To the general public, however, the term "charity" often connotes purely
donative, if not just alms'-giving or anti-poverty, institutions. Similar con-
notations also afflict the broader terms "philanthropic" and "benevolent."
Accordingly, those who drafted corporate statutes have gone in a dif-
ferent direction in adopting a term to embrace the wide variety of modem
charities-the hospitals, universities, religious organizations, and arts and
cultural organizations, as well as social service and grant-making organiza-
tions, that are not organized for the profit of owners. Yet the typical terms
in corporate statutes are all in the negative: "nonstock corporations", "not-
for-profit corporations", or, most commonly, "nonprofit corporations." The
proprietary sector is usually called "for-profit," as we refer to it here. How-
ever, both sectors are private and both are permitted to earn a surplus from
year to year. The prohibition more accurately is a prohibition on the distri-
bution of profits, prompting Henry Hansmann to coin the unfelicitous
phrase "nondistribution constraint." Nevertheless, the terms nonprofit and
not-for-profit both improperly suggest that the entity must operate at a
zero-profit margin.
More significantly, nonprofit corporations need not even be chari-
ties-think of social clubs, labor unions, and trade associations. The Re-
vised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (1987) offers three classifications
of non-business corporations: public-benefit corporations, mutual-benefit
corporations, and religious corporations. The term "public-benefit" has the
advantage of being an affirmative statement of the outward-looking pur-
poses of such organizations, but such a term has never been widely
adopted. Indeed, the Revised Model Act's tripartite distinction has not
proved popular with legislatures, and the Model Nonprofit Corporation
Act, Third Edition (2008) omits reference to it, falling back on some spe-
cial provisions for "charitable corporations."
Perhaps to deal with these terminological difficulties, it has become
common to refer instead to these organizations by their designation under
the Internal Revenue Code provisions for federal tax exemption. Thus,
"nonprofit," "tax-exempt" and "section 501(c)(3)" have become inter-
changeable ways to refer to charities. 2 Unfortunately, there are problems
2. Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) identifies the following organizations as exempt from
federal income taxation:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclu-
sively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational
purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition ... or for the pre-
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with this approach as well. First, not all charities are tax-exempt-that is,
assets might be protected as charitable under state law even if the entity has
never obtained, or subsequently forfeited, exempt status. Second, and most
unhappily for our purposes, the Code distinguishes "private foundations"
from non-private foundations, which are called colloquially "public chari-
ties"--even though there is no such thing in the Code as a "public founda-
tion" or a "private charity"! Finally, a state-law charity might be federally
tax-exempt under a different Code provision. Notably, as discussed below,
a state-law charity that engages in too much lobbying to qualify for Code
§ 501(c)(3) status might instead qualify as exempt under § 501(c)(4). The
largest trade association of §§ 501(c)(3) and (c)(4) organizations calls itself
the Independent Sector, but this term has not broadly caught on as a way of
referring to both types of exempt organizations.
Complicating these matters further is the ability of contributors to de-
duct donations from their income taxes. Donations to § 501(c)(3) organiza-
tions are normally deductible as charitable contributions, but, with minor
exceptions, donations to other § 501(c) entities may only be deductible, if
at all, as business expenses. Therefore, just as not all nonprofit entities are
exempt from taxation, not all exempt organizations afford the benefit of
deductibility for donations and membership dues.
We focus this article on those organizations that are nonprofit under
state law, exempt from taxation under § 501(c)(3) of federal tax law, and
that afford charitable deductions for donors-essentially foundations and
charities in all of their various forms, structures, and permutations. Outside
of the United States, the common referent to nonprofit entities is as "non-
governmental organizations" (and variants on that term). Again, though,
the NGO label is in the negative-it says what these organizations are not.
Perhaps, though, the emphasis on what charities are "not," as being "not
government," best addresses recent threats to the autonomy of the sector in
the United States.
vention of cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which
is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation.., and which
does not participate in, or intervene in ... any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposi-
tion to) any candidate for public office.
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). Treasury Regulation § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(2) explains: "The term 'charitable' is
used in section 501(c)(3) in its generally accepted legal sense and is, therefore, not to be construed as
limited by the separate enumerations in section 501 (c)(3) of other tax-exempt purposes which may fall
within the broad outlines of 'charity' as developed by judicial decisions." 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-
l(d)(2) (2009). The regulation continues by identifying "lessening of the burdens of Government" as
one example. Id. Code § 509(a) further distinguishes private foundations from other charities exempt
from taxation under § 501(c)(3). I.R.C. § 509(a). For ease of reference, we sometimes refer to all or-
ganizations that are not foundations under § 509(a) as "other charities." In footnotes, we sometimes cite
the Internal Revenue Code as "Code" or "I.R.C."
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Today we might be facing a semantic transformation that characterizes
foundations and other charitable assets as public money. Conflating public
purpose with public ownership further suggests that the elements of private
self-determination and private governance and decision-making over these
assets have been negated or at best neutered. In the minds of some, the
public thereby has expanded authority that could deny foundations and
charities the autonomy, freedom, independence, flexibility, and the other
features that have for centuries positioned them to serve society so well.
An early suggestion of this approach occurred when foundation assets
began to be labeled as public money. In 1972, the president of the Danforth
Foundation, Merriman Cuninggim, publicly struggled with a short-hand
way to characterize foundation assets and the legal obligation under the tax
code to dedicate those assets exclusively to charitable purposes. He called
it "public money" because, he explained, it no longer belonged to the do-
nor. At the same time, however, he also invoked the "immensely important
distinction" that the decisions of foundations remained "private" and be-
yond the "hands of the general public or of Government."'3 Cuninggim
proposed the term "non-governmental" as more accurate than "private" to
describe foundations. 4
More recently, however, some discount that "immensely important
distinction" of private decision-making by invoking the fact that the money
no longer belongs to the donor or by citing the tax-favored treatments of
exemption and deductibility. 5 Some groups have claimed an entitlement to
receive their "fair share" of charitable assets and to ensure representation
3. MERRIMON CUNINGGIM, PRIVATE MONEY AND PUBLIC SERVICE 4-5 (1972). Around the same
time, the Council on Foundations declared that foundations should adopt a key guiding principle that
recognizes that the assets are "not our money, but charity's" in order to "[t]o minimize any tendency to
act out of concems related to personal benefit or convenience." CHAIRMAN AND STAFF, COUNCIL ON
FOUNDATIONS, Private Foundations and the 1969 Tax Reform Act (1975), in 3 RESEARCH PAPERS
SPONSORED BY THE COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS, 1557, 1592 (1977)
[hereinafter FILER COMM'N RESEARCH PAPERS].
4. "A fuller definition might run to such a complicated, jawbreaking sentence as the following:
Foundations are non-governmental agencies, privately established and managed, but in which the public
has a stake and which are answerable to Government, possessing financial resources, usually in the
form of endowment, and existing to serve the general welfare or some chosen segment of it, usually in
the form of grants." CUNINGGIM, supra note 3, at 5.
5. Alan Pifer, the President of the Carnegie Corporation during that same era, rejected that view:
"There is a common misunderstanding that the public character of the foundation, and hence the public
stake in it, derives from its tax-exempt status. How frequently has one heard it said that foundations are
really spending public money, and therefore should be subject to greater governmental control. Such a
view, however, is based on fallacious reasoning and reveals either surprising ignorance or a dangerous
disavowal of one of the basic tenets of the American system." Alan Pifer, Report of the President of the
Carnegie Corporation, 1968, in FOUNDATIONS UNDER FIRE 54 (Reeves, ed., 1970).
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on foundation and charity boards and in management.6 A logical and not
too far-fetched extension of this public-money view could result in pervert-
ing the fiduciary duties of trustees, officers, directors, and managers to
require that charities be governed and managed for a democratically deter-
mined public, rather than privately determined charitable purposes. A fur-
ther leap would have foundations and other charities be managed by "the
public."
Recent years have brought debates-some reaching the level of legis-
lative proposals7-about the relationship between board composition and
good governance, and the policy implications. 8 A few states require that a
majority of directors of a nonprofit corporation be financially disinter-
ested. 9 Imposing certain governance practices not only could result in op-
erational changes, but also could infringe on the autonomy of these entities
6. See NAT'L COMM. FOR RESPONSIVE PHILANTHROPY, CRITERIA FOR PHILANTHROPY AT ITS
BEST: BENCHMARKS TO ASSESS AND ENHANCE GRANTMAKER IMPACT (2009), available at
http://www.ncrp.org/paib.
7. For example, in 2004 the staff of the Senate Finance Committee proposed to condition federal
tax exemption on a requirement that the size of the governing board be no fewer than three and no more
than fifteen members. Senate Finance Committee Staff Discussion Draft, Tax Exempt Governance
Proposals, June 22, 2004, at 13, available at
http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2004test/062204stfdis.pdf. See discussion under Myth III
infra.
8. A group convened by the charity trade association Independent Sector recommended: "Both
public charities and private foundations should be required to disclose which of their board members
are independent, even though private foundations would not be required to have any independent
members." See PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR, STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE,
ACCOUNTABILITY OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS: A FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS AND THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR 78 (2005), available at www.nonprofitpanel.org/final/PanelFinalReport.pdf.
That report explained: "Private foundations are subject to stringent self-dealing rules that do not apply
to public charities because of the assumption that their boards would not be independent. Many donors
to private foundations wish to involve family members on the boards of their foundations to ensure that
the donor's philanthropic intentions and the family's philanthropic tradition will continue through
future generations." Id. That report also recommended that a public charity (except certain entities, such
as churches) should be classified as a private foundation unless at least one-third of its board is inde-
pendent. Id.
9. See the limitation in California law that charity managers may make up no more than 49
percent of the board positions. CAL. CORP. CODE § 5227. See also Maine, 13-B MRSA § 713-a(2) ("No
more than 49% of the individuals on the board of a public benefit corporation may be financially inter-
ested persons."). The broadest prescription for governance structure-which contains exceptions for
private foundations and religious organizations-appears in New Hampshire's Voluntary Corporations
and Association statute, amended in 1996 to provide:
In the interest of encouraging diversity of discussion, connection with the public, and public
confidence, the board of directors of a charitable nonprofit corporation shall have at least 5
voting members, who are not of the same immediate family or related by blood or marriage.
No employee of a charitable nonprofit corporation shall hold the position of chairperson or
presiding officer of the board. This section shall not apply to... any organization qualified as
a private foundation under the applicable provisions of the United States Internal Revenue
Code, nor to religious organizations, churches, or the integrated auxiliaries thereof or to con-
ventions or associations of churches. The provisions of this section may be waived with the
approval of the director of charitable trusts after application for such waiver.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292:6-a.
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and their fiduciaries to determine their charitable purposes and how to carry
them out.
Separately, in important but less visible ways, the Internal Revenue
Service has increasingly focused on the governance, structures, missions,
effectiveness, programs, and other operations of foundations and other
charities, through its administration of the Internal Revenue Code. IRS
determination letters denying or revoking exemption reveal that the Service
has informally been staking out positions on a range of substantive issues
about whether a particular activity or governance practice jeopardizes tax
exemption. For example, it is understood that the Service demands a mini-
mum of three unrelated board members-although, because such a re-
quirement does not appear in the statute or regulations, the Service cannot
deny exemption on this basis alone. The newly redesigned Form 990 re-
quires detailed disclosure of board member independence, compensation,
and other policies. In 2008, a high-level advisory board to the Tax-
Exempt/Government Entities Commissioner observed: "Our personal ex-
perience and research for this report suggest ... that the IRS may require
specific governance practices on an ad hoc and inconsistent basis."' 10 The
Report found that, "[i]n various contexts, as the IRS has labored" to draw
the line between taxable and exempt, "it has created a per se requirement
for exemption that requires the organization be governed by an independent
body. The IRS's position, however, has not always been sustained by the
courts and we are concerned about per se requirements.""II
Each of these positions is based on a belief that foundation and charity
assets are public money in some tangible manner beyond mere semantics.
As such, that phrase and its derivatives invite visions of certain rights and
authority not actually contemplated by the law or our country's long history
of respect for and dependence on foundations and charities and their
broader roles in our society.
As noted above, our research and experiences suggest three primary
arguments that underlie this transformation, which we characterize as the
three "myths" addressed below. We call them myths because they seem to
be cloaked in presumptive, factual accuracy despite evidence to the con-
trary. Myth I purports to deprive charities and foundations of their inde-
pendence and autonomy based on their public purposes and attorney
general oversight. Myth II relies on a mischaracterization of these entities
10. Advisory Committee on Tax Exempt and Government Entities, The Appropriate Role Of The
Internal Revenue Service With Respect To Tax-Exempt Organization Good Governance Issues 3 (June
11, 2008), at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/tege-act-rpt7.pdf.
11. Id. at 31 (citation omitted).
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as state actors and public or quasi-governmental bodies. Myth III, the ar-
gument that proponents seem to rely on most heavily, cites to tax-favored
treatment as justification for intrusions. As we demonstrate below, none of
these myths validates the types of impositions that the semantic transforma-
tion discussed above purports to warrant.
I. MYTH I: HAVING PUBLIC PURPOSES AND BEING SUBJECT TO
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S PARENS PATRIE POWER, FOUNDATIONS
AND CHARITIES MUST SERVE THE SAME ENDS AS GOVERNMENT,
AND GOVERNMENTS AND THE PUBLIC ARE ENTITLED TO A SAY IN
DECISION-MAKING, GOVERNANCE, MISSION, AND EFFECTIVENESS
OF FOUNDATIONS AND OTHER CHARITIES.
Myth I essentially characterizes foundations and charities as "shadow
governments" accountable to the public as such as a matter of law. 12 In
essence, the requirement that charities serve public purposes gets miscon-
strued into a requirement that a particular charity's purpose is susceptible
to the will of the general public. The fact that health, education, and social-
service-providing nonprofits derive significant funding from the govern-
ment contributes to a blurred view of the sector. Of course, even if they
wanted to, foundations will never be able to substitute for the vastly supe-
rior resources of government, which dwarf the resources of foundations.
A. Myth Debunked
The requirement of a public benefit does not render a foundation or
other charity a governmental agency, nor does the fact of their importance
to society render foundation or charity assets or operations public. Those
who create a foundation or other charitable organization can choose its
particular charitable purposes (e.g., fields of focus), organizational form (as
charity or corporation), and governance structure (foundations usually have
no members with the right to elect the board). Subsequent boards and man-
agers then have the broad authority to carry out (and even modify, subject
to statutory requirements) those purposes as they see fit. The legitimate
12. See Jackson v. Statler Found., 496 F.2d 623, 627-28 n.6 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. den. 420 U.S.
927 (1975) ("Professor Jeffrey Hart speaks of foundations as 'shadow governments.' . . . Professor John
Simon disagrees and presents a cogent defense of the unique role of these organizations."). See gener-
ally JENNIFER R. WOLCH, THE SHADOW STATE: GOVERNMENT AND VOLUNTARY SECTOR IN
TRANSITION 217 (1990) ("A final and perhaps most troubling dilemma of the shadow state is that the
voluntary sector may become a puppet or pawn in the service of goals that are antithetical to their
organizational mission. Organizations that do not conform or are not 'ideologically correct' from the
perspective of the state at a given historical moment may be denied access to direct and even indirect
resources.").
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interest of the public in the expenditure of foundation funds (and the opera-
tions of other charities) does not lead to the conclusion that the public has
the legal right to dictate charity purposes and operations. Rather, the pub-
lic's exercise of its right to participate in the robust debate about whether
the charitable sector, and particular foundations or other charities, carry out
their purposes occurs in the context of how those purposes are framed by
their founders, supporters, and fiduciaries-and as they may properly be
amended or modified.
Nor does the state's authority to regulate and supervise charities lead
to the conclusion that their assets belong to the general public. For hun-
dreds of years of Anglo-American common law, the state-usually through
the parens patriae authority of the state attorney general-has the responsi-
bility to ensure that charitable assets are used for the intended purposes.
The attorney general has this role because there's often nobody else to en-
force charitable fiduciary duties-not because these are public assets. The
attorney general has broad investigative powers, and typically achieves
reform through counseling charity fiduciaries on their duties and entering
into settlements. Compulsory powers, however, are generally reserved to
the courts. While the attorney general is vested with the authority to go to
court to seek to correct breaches of charity responsibilities and of fiduciary
duty that have not otherwise been remedied by the board, the attorney gen-
eral is not a "super" member of the board. Indeed, we must be vigilant to
guard against impermissible attorney general, legislative, and judicial paro-
chialism and paternalism in charity oversight.
B. Private Parties Choose and Carry Out the Public Purpose
The particular segment of the public being served by the foundation or
other charity is one aspect of the organization's purpose. Importantly, the
requirement of a public benefit does not imply that all members of the gen-
eral public or of a particular political subdivision are necessarily the in-
tended beneficiaries. Indeed, the use of the terms "public" or "community"
is not necessarily geographic. Rather, founders and thereafter those govern-
ing the charity and its members (if any), determine whether the charity's
operations will have a particular geographic scope. Moreover, there is no
single version of public benefit: A wide variety of charities focus on com-
plementary, overlapping, or even completing issues.
The issue arises from time to time-particularly with respect to fed-
eral or state tax exemption (discussed in Myth III, below)-about whether
the requirement to have charitable purposes includes a specific obligation
to serve the poor. For example, policy makers hear increasing demands for
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charities-notably the two largest nonprofit subsectors, hospitals and
higher education-to provide greater distributional equity. Prompted by
financial pressures on public finance systems, at both the state and federal
level, politicians concerned about the health needs of the uninsured are
tempted to define "charity" as "charity care" and impose it as a condition of
tax exemption for nonprofit hospitals.
However, one can argue that an anti-poverty requirement for exemp-
tion has the normative policy backwards: that charity should complement
not supplement government. Because of its ability to raise taxes and to
allocate resources across the population as a whole, government has the
comparative advantage in redistributing income or benefits in a fair and
cost-effective way. At the same time, charities have the comparative advan-
tage in ascertaining local and specialized needs, allowing for service deliv-
ery that is flexible and compassionate. Such a program can be as simple as
government providing targeted funds (such as Medicaid or Medicare reim-
bursement) or tax benefits (such as the education tax credits) to individual
consumers to obtain needed services. Indeed, a great deal of social services
is provided through just such public-private partnerships or voucher pro-
grams: Government supplies the funding and the program requirements,
but nonprofits (and sometimes even businesses) provide the services.1 3
Finally, a demand that foundations and other charities serve govern-
mental purposes neglects the benefits that such organizations provide pre-
cisely because they are not the government. Nonprofits (including
foundations) are important vehicles for expression. Views differ on many
subjects (consider family planning, educational approaches, environmental
issues), and many nonprofits express non-majoritarian ideas. Congruence
with "the government" (whether at the community level, state level, or
nationally) is neither the function of foundations or other charities nor de-
sirable for our society.
C. Limited Role of the State in Charity Governance
Those who create and govern foundations and other charities choose
not only the charitable purposes to be served, but also the processes by
which those purposes will be fulfilled. These means include the composi-
tion of the governing board. Importantly, the treatment of foundations and
other charities as privately organized and operated bodies precludes the
13. See U.S. Government Accountability Office, Nonprofit Sector: Significant Federal Funds
Reach the Sector through Various Mechanisms, but More Complete and Reliable Funding Data are
Needed (GAO-09-193), available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d09193.pdf (Feb. 2009).
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state-except in unusual circumstances (discussed under Myth II, below)-
from mandating that the governing board members include public officials
or representatives of the community it serves. 14 Similarly, the law generally
refrains from dictating how a board should carry out its duties of setting
policy and engaging and supervising officers. 15
Inappropriate regulations and enforcement can effectively achieve
confiscation of charitable assets. Consider the thwarted attempt by the Mil-
ton Hershey School Trust to diversify its holdings of Hershey Foods Cor-
poration in 2002. Following an announcement by the Hershey Trust
offering the stock for sale, the legislature and the attorney general began
drafting legislation that would require, among other things, that a charitable
trust considering a sale of a controlling business interest to consider the
welfare of the affected community, as well as require attorney general and
judicial approval. Invoking the proposed legislation, the attorney general-
also a candidate for governor-filed suit to halt any sale without court ap-
proval.
Paragraph 14 of the attorney general's court petition asserted:
Any public sale of the controlling interest in Hershey Foods Corporation
by the School Trust, while likely to increase the value of the trust, could
also result in profound negative consequences for the Hershey commu-
nity and surrounding areas, including, but not limited to, the closing
and/or withdrawal of Hershey Foods Corporation from the local commu-
nity together with a dramatic loss of the region's employment opportuni-
ties, related businesses, and tax base. 16
Invoking case law granting the attorney general authority "to inquire
into the status, activities and functioning of public charities" and the view
that "the ultimate beneficiary and real party in interest of all charitable
14. See, for example, a Texas appeals court decision refusing to authorize the expansion of the
board of a $120-million family foundation from three to seven:
If... a court could disregard the settlor's plan for administration of a public charity simply
because the judge believed that another plan would be better, such rule would substantially
discourage the establishment of charitable trusts, or, at least, encourage the settlors to seek
other jurisdictions in which to establish them. The adoption of such rule also would upset the
stability of many of the charitable foundations that now exist in Texas[, many of which ...
including the largest ones, have fewer than seven trustees.
Moody v. Haas, 493 S.W.2d 555, 567 (Tex. App. 1973). The court seemed particularly disturbed by
expert testimony calling for representation on the board that reflect geographic, professional, and
minority-group diversity, observing of these to-be-majority trustees: "The selection of individuals who
are to administer the trust may substantially influence not only the manner in which the trust is adminis-
tered but also the areas of the charitable purpose that will be emphasized." Id. at 562, 564.
15. See generally Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity
Law Enforcement 79 IND. L.J. 937, 1008-17 (2004).
16. Petition for Citation for Rule to Show Cause Why a Proposed Sale of Trust Assets Constitut-
ing the Controlling Interest in Hershey Foods Corporation Should Not be Conditioned upon Court
Approval at 3, In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, No. 712, (Orphans' Ct., Ct. C.P., Dauphin Cty, Pa.,
Aug. 12, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/hershey/pavhershey081202pet.pdf.
[Vol 85:2
FOUNDA TION AND CHARITY AUTONOMY
trusts is the general public to whom the social and economic advantages of
the trusts accrue," the petition declared in paragraph 18 (emphasis in origi-
nal): "Accordingly, the broad interests of the Attorney General necessarily
entail protecting the public against any social and economic disadvantages
which may be occasioned by the activities and functioning of public chari-
ties .... ,"17 The Orphans' Court agreed with the attorney general that
"[p]roperty given to a charity is in a measure public property," and that
"the Attorney General has the authority to inquire whether an exercise of a
trustee's power, even if authorized under the trust instrument, is inimical to
the public interest." 18 The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court upheld the
preliminary injunction against the sale issued by the Orphans' Court.19
Well advised creators of charities-as well as donors having signifi-
cant assets to bestow on society-keep a close eye on the regulatory envi-
ronment. State attorneys general that overreach by interfering in the
autonomy of charities organized in their states could discourage the crea-
tion of charities in-state-and could even prompt an exodus of charities
from the jurisdiction.20
17. Id. at4.
18. In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807 A.2d 324, 330 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002).
19. Id. at 335.
20. See Carl J. Schramm, Law Outside the Market: the Social Utility of the Private Foundation, 30
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 355 (2006). Schramm comments: once attorneys general become involved,
"the record shows that the scope of state investigation and action has far exceeded the common law
power to ensure that funds within a foundation are being applied in the public interest. Furthermore, the
vagueness of most state charity statutes allows investigations to proceed as though the attorney general
actually possessed the authority to ensure that the funds are used in the subjectively-determined 'best'
interest of the public." Id. at 412-13. Schramm concludes by calling for "an implicit private-public
treaty" "among donors, trustees, and the government. He adds:
The burden also falls on the donor and trustees to not tempt government to examine the ac-
tions of the foundation and potentially restrict its freedom .... [Floundations must articulate
programs that, using a wide perspective, advance human welfare in the context of democratic
capitalism. For its part, government generally ought to defer to the trustees and executives,
with four exceptions: egregious cases of obvious frivolous action, instances where foundation
resources are diverted for private gain, programs that set out to erode or destroy aspects of our
system of democratic capitalism, or instances where foundation resources are used to advance
partisan political ends.
Attorneys general must refrain from adopting the convenient notion that foundations are to
operate democratically under the direction of either constituent groups or elected officials.
Such an approach not only offends the historical legal theory of foundation freedom of action
but also trades away the potential such organizations possess for long term fundamental




II. MYTH II: BECAUSE, ALONG WITH CERTAIN ADDITIONAL
FACTORS, FOUNDATIONS AND OTHER CHARITIES ARE CHARTERED
BY THE STATE, THEY AMOUNT TO STATE ACTORS OR MUST BE
OVERSEEN AND HELD TO ACCOUNT AS QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL
BODIES.
Myth II assumes that because nonprofit corporations cannot exist
without a state charter, the charter carries with it the approval of the state.
(Certain other permissible forms for charity, notably the charitable trust and
unincorporated charitable associations, organize under state law without a
charter from the state.) Moreover, this relationship gives the state the au-
thority to alter charitable purposes and governance structure and otherwise
intervene in the operations of foundations and other charities. 21
Separately, this Myth asserts that certain additional factors transform
foundations and other charities into state actors, so that their behavior is
constrained by constitutional protections applicable to those who operate
under color of state law. Under Myth II, foundations and charities should
be subject to legislative mandates that impose public-sector standards of
transparency and accountability, possibly including such things as the fol-
lowing or some combination thereof: open board meetings, open decision-
making, open records, government appointed boards, and programs that
serve the needs of the public as dictated by those in power as govern-
ment.22
A. Myth Debunked
Most foundations and other charities derive their existence under state
laws allowing the formation and operation of nonprofit corporate enter-
prises. However, the mere granting of a charter does not equate with state
endorsement or adoption of the enterprise, nor does it justify interfering
with the underlying contract that the charter represents or subjecting such
organizations to the requirements of the Equal Protection or Due Process
clauses of the Constitution.
21. In a striking example, a bill introduced in the New York state assembly in March 2009 pro-
posed legislative findings that the state's right to impose restrictions on asset sales by New York muse-
ums is based on the fact that "all" museums in the state are "creatures of State government" and,
therefore, "are subject to the public interest" all because they are "directly chartered by the legislature."
State Assembly A6959-A, 2009-10 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2009) available at
http://assembly.state.n.v.us/leg/?bn=A06959&sh=t (last visited Feb. 18, 2009).
22. Of course, there would be some limits on the openness of records and meetings regarding
personnel matters, pending litigation, active negotiations to acquire real estate, and the few other things
generally recognized as exceptions to state and federal sunshine laws.
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In a landmark ruling that recognized a nonprofit corporation's right to
a charter, the high court of New York emphasized that the issuance of a
charter is not to be viewed as state endorsement of the particular purpose of
the organization. 23 Speech and associational rights would lose their mean-
ing if the state could withhold charters from organizations dedicated to
lawful, societal goals but taking positions with which the state--or even a
majority of the public-disagreed.
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court held in the seminal 1819
case of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward24 that the charter of a
nonprofit corporation is a contract protected under the Contracts Clause of
the U.S. Constitution against unilateral state legislative amendment. Reject-
ing the New Hampshire legislature's attempt to expand the number of di-
rectors of the college and to convert it into a university, Chief Justice John
Marshall, writing for the court, declared: "This [act] may be for the advan-
tage of this college in particular, and may be for the advantage of literature
in general; but it is not according to the will of the donors, and is subver-
sive of that contract, on the faith of which their property was given. '25 Not
incidentally, Justice Marshall emphasized that "the objects of the contribu-
tors, and the incorporating act, were the same[:] the promotion of
[C]hristianity, and of education generally, not the interests of New-
Hampshire particularly. '26 The Dartmouth College case has not only stood
firm and unblemished for almost two hundred years, but also it has been
resolutely cited for the principles at stake. (Today, such protections against
impermissible action by a state would likely be found under the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.)
From the other direction, if receiving their charter or other factors
were to render foundations and other charities "state actors," these other-
wise private organizations would be held liable for violating the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution, which can be
violated only by government action. While having a state charter alone is
not enough, litigation arises from time to time about what factors lead to
the conclusion that a nonprofit organization is "acting under color of law,"
thus subjecting it statutorily to requirements imposed on governments. 27 As
23. Ass'n for Pres. of Freedom of Choice v. Shapiro, 174 N.E.2d 487, 490 (N.Y. 1961). See
generally NORMAN 1. SILBER, A CORPORATE FORM OF FREEDOM: THE EMERGENCE OF THE NONPROFIT
SECTOR (2001).
24. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (4 Wheat.) (1819).
25. Id. at 653.
26. Id. at 640.
27. Of course, finding state action does not require finding that the state action is unconstitutional.
Moreover, at least in theory, a nonprofit treated as the state would, by the same token, enjoy such
benefits as sovereign immunity.
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with the other Myths, because the implications of this label can be so de-
structive to the otherwise private organization and to the proper role of
government, the Supreme Court and other courts have been deliberate in
developing and applying criteria for determining if an otherwise private
enterprise should be considered a state actor, and not very many founda-
tions or charities qualify. Efforts to uniformly classify foundations or chari-
ties as public, state, or governmental (or quasi-government) bodies-
without applying a proper case-by-case analysis-would have substantial
negative consequences. Judge Henry Friendly makes this point so elo-
quently and forcefully that we refer to his jurisprudence extensively in the
discussion below.
Even when not deemed a state actor, a specific nonprofit organization
might properly be treated as a quasi-governmental public body under one
or more state or federal narrowly defined Sunshine Laws. However, while,
as described under Myth III, voluntarily pursued operational transparency
of foundations and charities can be a powerful means of earning the public
trust, open-meetings and open-records laws intended to ensure oversight of
government do not broadly apply to foundations and charities. Legislative
bodies and courts have been appropriately careful in establishing criteria
for determining if an entity should be subject to these laws, and there are
not compelling reasons to expand these special cases to encompass founda-
tions and charities generally (even if such an expansion is possible without
violating the U.S. Constitution).
If the charter argument held, then the autonomy, privacy, and inde-
pendence of any enterprises-including business corporations-that re-
ceive their legal status from the state would be in jeopardy, such that they
could be declared public at any time.
B. Granting of a State Charter Does Not Render Nonprofit Organizations
Government Agencies
In his influential concurring opinion to the 1819 Dartmouth College
decision, Justice Joseph Story declared: "That the mere act of incorporation
will not change the charity from a private to a public one, is most distinctly
asserted in the authorities. ''28 Justice Story observed: "The fact, then, that
the charit[able purpose] is public, affords no proof that the corporation is
also public; and, consequently, the argument, so far as it is built on this
foundation, falls to the ground. If, indeed, the argument were correct, it
would follow, that almost every hospital and college would be a public
28. 17 U.S. at 670 (Story, J., concurring).
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corporation; a doctrine utterly irreconcilable with the whole current of de-
cisions since the time of Lord Coke." 29
The state, of course, retains appropriate regulatory authority over cor-
porations. Thus, the state sets basic ground rules for the governance struc-
tures and practices of business corporations in order to protect their
shareholders, just as the state regulates the governance structures and prac-
tices of nonprofit corporations in order to protect the purposes they serve.
Justice Story explained, though, what the state may not do:
When the corporation is said [by the state] . .. to be public, it is not
merely meant, that the whole community may be the proper objects of
the bounty, but that the government have the sole right, as trustees of the
public interests, to regulate, control, and direct the public interests, to
regulate, control, and direct the corporation, and its funds and its fran-
chises, at its own good will and pleasure. Now, such an authority does
not exist in the government, except where the corporation is in the strict-
est sense public; that is, where its whole interests and franchises are the
exclusive property and domain of the government itself.30
Within generally applicable legitimate requirements, those who create
a foundation or charity are free to choose the organizational form (such as
trust or corporation), governance details and structure (like many operating
charities, foundations usually have no members with the right to elect the
board), and strategies for pursuing charitable mission.
States still occasionally try to overreach, and experiences in Maryland,
Illinois, and New Hampshire serve as clarion calls. Almost 140 years after
Dartmouth College, the high court of Maryland similarly prevented the
effective confiscation-by-regulation of assets held for the benefit of, but
outside, the University of Maryland system.31 In ruling on an Illinois stat-
29. Id. at 671 (footnote omitted).
30. Id. at 671-72. Justice Story added: "Yet, who ever thought before, that the munificent gifts of
private donors for general charity became instantaneously the property of the government; and that the
trustees appointed by the donors, whether corporate or unincorporated, might be compelled to yield up
their rights to whomsoever the government might appoint to administer them? If we were to establish
such a principle, it would extinguish all future eleemosynary endowments; and we should find as little
of public policy, as we now find of law to sustain it." Id. at 672.
31. In 1951, Maryland adopted a statute replacing the nine current members of the Endowment
Fund (a nonprofit corporation) with the Regents of the University of Maryland (and anyone else the
Regents appoint). In Board of Regents of the University of Maryland v. Trustees of the Endowment
Fund of the University of Maryland, 112 A.2d 678 (Md. 1955), the Maryland high court ruled that the
legislature had gone too far in reserving an absolute right unilaterally to amend the nonprofit corpora-
tion's charter. Id. at 686. Quoting a decision of the United States Supreme Court, the court declared:
"'The reserved power is not unlimited and cannot be exerted to defeat the purpose for which the corpo-
rate powers were granted ... or arbitrarily to make alterations that are inconsistent with the scope and
object of the charter or to destroy or impair any vested property right."' Id. at 683 (quoting Philips
Petroleum Co. v. Jenkins, 297 U.S. 629, 634 (1936)). Ruling the legislative change to be fundamental,
the court commented: "The charter plan was designed to retain to the donors, through the exercise of
discretion by their chosen representatives and their self-appointed successors, a voice in the manage-
ment and expenditure of the fund, subject, of course, to a veto power by the Regents. The views of this
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ute, the Seventh Circuit in 2004 refused to find a foundation that was cre-
ated under specific legislation and having public officials as board mem-
bers to be part of the state, such that the legislature could directly
confiscate its assets for the state's own purposes, as determined by those in
power.32 Citing Dartmouth College, Judge Richard Posner wrote:
The fact that the state legislature authorized the creation of the plaintiff
foundation does not make the foundation a state agency; for the legisla-
ture also authorizes the creation of business and professional corpora-
tions, not to mention religious and charitable corporations, without
thereby acquiring a right to confiscate such entities' assets.33
In 2009, a New Hampshire court, in a successful derivative suit
brought by policyholders of a state-created medical malpractice insurance
nonprofit organization (although not a charity), blocked the state from
claiming for its general fund a $110 million surplus earned by the organiza-
tion. 34 Therefore, overreaching efforts by the state to assert control over
otherwise private nonprofit assets are neither dated nor obsolete.
independent group may, from time to time, differ widely from those of the current managers of the
University." Id. at 684.
32. I1l. Clean Energy Cmty. Found. v. Filan, 392 F.3d 934, 936-38 (7th Cir. 2004). The decision
raised the question of who controls a $225 million nonprofit corporate foundation established by Com-
monwealth Edison of Illinois as a condition to obtaining approval to sell its seven fossil-fuel power
plants for $4.8 billion. Id. at 935. According to the enabling statute, the Foundation's mission is to make
grants to public and private institutions in Illinois for projects to conserve energy and improve the
environment. Id. But then the state of Illinois needed money. Subsequent legislation sought to compel
the Foundation "to turn over to the state's treasury and state environmental agencies up to $25 million,
which is to be used for funding the agencies and repaying state general obligation bonds." Id. at 936.
Judge Posner differentiated permissible regulation from impermissible takings:
The coercive element in the history of the authorizing statute is irrelevant. Suppose the state
didn't think that lawyers should be permitted to incorporate, and passed a law requiring that
all professional corporations of lawyers be converted to partnerships. Would the partnership
assets be public property? Obviously not. Supposing the state could indeed have forced Co-
mEd to disgorge $125 million of its profits from the sale of the power plants, or indeed much
more, to the ratepayers, could it then, years later, have ordered the ratepayers to contribute
their rebates to the state treasury, on the ground that it was really the state's money? We can-
not see what difference it makes that the disgorgement was to a foundation rather than to in-
dividuals. By forcing a transfer of private property from one private entity to another, the state
did not destroy the private character of the property. If the state orders a criminal to make res-
titution of a sum of money to the victim of his crime, it cannot snatch the money back from
the victim on the ground that it's the state's money.
Id. at 937. Judge Posner added: "This suit would go nowhere had the statute creating the plaintiff
foundation reserved the right of the state to confiscate the foundation's assets. There is no such reserva-
tion." Id. at 937.
33. Id. at 936-37 (citing Trs. of Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 638-40). Judge Posner
concluded: "All the state is left to argue is that the appointment of five-sixths of the foundation's trus-
tees by state officials made the foundation a state agency. Not so. By whomever appointed, the trustees
of a charitable foundation have a fiduciary duty to conserve the foundation's assets.... It would be a
fiction therefore to suggest that because public officials appoint most of the trustees, the state 'controls'
the foundation. If it really controlled it, we wouldn't have this lawsuit." Id. at 937-38 (citations omit-
ted).
34. Tuttle v. N.H. Med. Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass'n, No. 09-E-0148, slip op. at 26-27
(Belknap Cnty. Super. Ct., July 29, 2009), available at
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C. In General, Foundations and Other Charities Enjoy Constitutional
Freedoms of Association and Expression, and Are Not Subject to Constitu-
tional Constraints Imposed on State Actors
As mentioned above, a state agency-such as a public college or gov-
ernment employer-must adhere to the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment (for action by one of the states) and
to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment (for federal action), as
well as other constitutional requirements. By the same token, if a founda-
tion or charity is treated as part of the state (as described next), it presuma-
http://www.courts.state.nh.us/superior/superorders/tuttle.pdf, aftd, -A.2d -, 2010 WL 313403, *2
(N.H. Jan. 28, 2010). Under the insurance regulations, the JUA has a seven-person board of directors
that is appointed by the Insurance Commissioner from a list nominated by the board; three are health
care providers, two are representatives of member insurers, and two are members of the public. Board
meetings must be publicly noticed and held under the Right to Know Law, and minutes are available to
the public. See N.H. CODE ADMIN R. ANN. INS. §§ 1703.03-.05 (2009). Profits are to be used to reduce
future payments by member insurers or distributed to them on liquidation.
In June 2009, a month prior to the superior court decision cited above, the court had ruled that
the state attorney general's office is disqualified from representing the JUA because "[t]he JUA is a
quasi-public/private entity... separate... from the Insurance Department... and not part of the
executive branch of State government." Tuttle, No. 09-E-0148, slip op. at 10 (quoting Tuttle v. N.H.
Med. Malpractice Joint Underwriting Ass'n, No. 09-E-0148 (Belknap Cnty. Super. Ct. June 25, 2009)).
In the July decision, the court ruled that the JUA is not a state agency after finding, among other factors,
that: (1) the "JUA board has exclusive control over its operating fund"; (2) the "State did not financially
contribute to the creation of the JUA and has not contributed any funds since that time"; (3) the "State is
not responsible for any JUA shortfalls and does not guarantee performance of JUA obligations"; and (4)
"the JUA board and its staff are not state employees." Id. at 11-12. Looking for analogies in other
jurisdictions, the court cited Texas Catastrophe Property Insurance Association v. Morales, 975 F.2d
1178 (5th Cir. 1992), which had ruled that that association is not a state agency; accordingly, the court
struck down a provision in the enabling legislation that required the association to be represented in all
matters by the state attorney general rather than by an attorney of its choosing. Id. at 13-14.
The superior court's July 2009 decision ruled that the oversight authority of the state insurance
commission-including the requirement that the commissioner must approve the distribution of divi-
dends to policyholders, who are ultimately entitled to any surplus (as well as liable for any shortfall)-
"does not negate the private nature of the entity. 'That the state holds, and exercises, the coercive power
to force private insurers doing business in Texas to cover certain risks does not mean that the money
coming out of the companies' bank accounts is state money. It is private money directed to pay private
claims."' Id. at 14 (quoting Texas Catastrophe, 975 F.2d at 1182-83.) Finally, the court rejected the
argument that JUA's tax-exempt status make it a part of state government; rather, tax-exemption is
among the financial tools "that states may offer to mandatory risk sharing plans such as the JUA to shift
to the government a portion of the burden of insuring high-risk individuals or entities who would oth-
erwise be unable to find coverage in the voluntary market . I.." d. The court held that the New Hamp-
shire statute violates the Takings Clauses of the federal and state constitutions, as well as an impairment
of the UJA's contract obligations under the Contracts Clause of both constitutions. Id. at 27.
By a three to two vote, the New Hampshire supreme court affirmed on Contracts Clause
grounds, without addressing the issue of whether the JUA is a state agency. While the court did not rule
on the takings claim, it observed that the "funding scheme is qualitatively different from social or
economic regulatory legislation which establishes a broad-based mechanism for addressing a public
need." Compare Brody, supra note 15, at 1026-32 (describing the experience in New York involving
the conversion of Empire Blue Cross to a taxable entity, and the acquiescence by the charity's board
that nearly all of the sale proceeds should be contributed to a state fund).
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bly also would enjoy such benefits as sovereign immunity and, for an ac-
crediting association, exemption from antitrust law.
State action can appear in various guises. In particular, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 creates a remedy for violations of federal constitutional rights
against persons acting under color of state law. From time to time, the as-
sertion is made that a charity must abide by constitutional requirements
imposed on the government, or is subject to a federal statute that applies to
agencies of the United States or to a state statute that applies to a state or
lesser government. "Like the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment," however, "the under-color-of-state-law element of § 1983
excludes from its reach 'merely private conduct, no matter how discrimina-
tory or wrongful .... ,,,35 Moreover, "[i]n cases involving extensive state
regulation of private activity," the Supreme Court has "consistently held
that 'the mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not by
itself convert its action into that of the State for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment. "'36
Holding a foundation or other charity to government standards could
affect practices in employment matters, service delivery, and a range of
other activities. For a charity having members, constitutional and statutory
due process requirements would apply to disciplinary or expulsion proce-
dures. The consequences of being characterized as a state actor could be
catastrophic, and broadly characterizing foundations and other charities as
state actors would upset the traditional relationships between such organi-
zations and government. Accordingly, courts have insisted on a fact-
intensive, case-by-case analysis of the issue, and they have refused to ap-
prove any categorical assertions that such organizations are subject to state-
actor constraints. Under the criteria developed and applied by the courts, it
is the rare foundation or charity that would qualify as such.
By contrast, constitutional constraints do not apply to private persons
not acting under color of law. Private organizations generally can operate
in all their fractious and insular splendor, free of what Nancy Rosenblum
calls the "logic of congruence"-the demand "that the internal life and
organization of associations mirror liberal democratic principles and prac-
tices."' 37 We might not like the structure or internal organization of some
35. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457
U.S. 991, 1002 (1982) (citations omitted)).
36. Id. at 52 (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974)). See Blum, 457
U.S. at 1004.
37. NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE PERSONAL USES OF PLURALISM IN
AMERICA 36-41 (1998). See generally Evelyn Brody, Entrance, Voice and Exit: The Constitutional
Bounds of the Right ofAssociation, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 821 (2002).
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nonprofits-such as groups that exclude from membership and leadership
positions those who do not believe in God or who are homosexuals. While
the public is free to criticize such a structure or practice, any pressure
brought to bear on an expressive organization to change its membership
criteria cannot be backed up by legal compulsion. 38
Much, if not most, of the diversity of the charitable sector is viewed as
desirable, and its availability a spur to philanthropy and participation. Thus,
a grant-making foundation can devote its funds to providing scholarships to
students from a particular school district; to research into a cure for a dis-
ease that afflicted the founder's child; or to the preservation of a dying
Native American language. A private membership organization can provide
rules for internal decision-making, such as granting some members greater
voting power than others, or denying some classes of members the right to
vote. Membership groups effectively enjoy the power of exile through the
right to expel members who breach their rules. Educational institutions
traditionally accord their faculty with a strong governance role, as well as
academic freedom. Diversity of beliefs is not limited to religious groups.
Nonprofits can and do form on all sides of a contentious issue; moreover,
an expressive organization need affirmatively not take positions on conten-
tious issues to enjoy protection. Justice Powell famously praised "the im-
portant role played by tax exemptions in encouraging diverse, indeed often
sharply conflicting, activities and viewpoints. '39
Painful as the result might be, a member unhappy with a group's pol-
icy, and who is unable to persuade the group to change policy, can always
exercise the power of exit, and form another group, just as a dissatisfied
donor can use her market power to withhold future contributions. Indeed,
the simultaneous exercise of voice and exit after the Boy Scouts case dra-
matically illustrates both the virtues and consequences of a freedom to
associate. In the end, we accept high transaction costs in entering and exit-
ing association because the alternative-obliteration of difference-brings
higher social costs in the form of reduced autonomy and liberty.
As a threshold matter, when litigation arises about whether a particular
private entity can properly be treated as a state actor, and thus subject to the
constitutional constraints and potential liabilities that apply to government,
a foundation or charity cannot claim nongovernmental status based simply
on a functional distinction between the public and nonprofit sectors. Justice
Harlan described the difficulties of applying such a test: "While this proc-
38. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
39. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 576, 609 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring). See
generally Myth III, infra.
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ess of analogy might be spun out to reach privately owned orphanages,
libraries, garbage collection companies, detective agencies, and a host of
other functions commonly regarded as nongovernmental though paralleling
fields of governmental activity, the example of schools is, I think, sufficient
to indicate the pervasive potentialities of this 'public function' theory of
state action."'40
Acknowledging the difficulty of making a state-actor determination,
the Supreme Court has discussed the controlling policy:
Our cases try to plot a line between state action subject to Fourteenth
Amendment scrutiny and private conduct (however exceptionable) that is
not. The judicial obligation is not only to "'preserve an area of individual
freedom by limiting the reach of federal law' and avoid the imposition of
responsibility on a State for conduct it could not control," but also to as-
sure that constitutional standards are invoked "when it can be said that
the State is responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff
complains." If the Fourteenth Amendment is not to be displaced, there-
fore, its ambit cannot be a simple line between States and people operat-
ing outside formally governmental organizations, and the deed of an
ostensibly private organization or individual is to be treated sometimes
as if a State had caused it to be performed. Thus, we say that state action
may be found if, though only if, there is such a "close nexus between the
State and the challenged action" that seemingly private behavior "may be
fairly treated as that of the State itself."41
Courts have almost uniformly refrained from declaring that, without
more, a foundation or charity is a state actor merely because it organizes
under a state-issued charter or has tax-exempt status, receives and expends
public funds, or has public officials on its board of directors.
A common set of nonprofits vulnerable to treatment as state actors are
those that were spun off by the state, such as some public hospitals and
public museums. Indeed, one "variant [of] the 'public function' cases con-
cern particular activities or facilities so clearly governmental in nature that
the state cannot be permitted to escape responsibility by allowing them to
be managed by a supposedly private agency. '42 Typically, enabling legisla-
40. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 322 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
41. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn.Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001) (emphasis
in original) (citations omitted).
42. Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 80 (2d Cir. 1968). In Hack v. President and Fellows of Yale
College, 237 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2000), the Second Circuit ruled that Yale University was not a state actor
or instrumentality, and so did not violate plaintiffs' religious rights protected under the Constitution and
§ 1983 by requiring all unmarried freshmen and sophomores under the age of twenty-one to reside in
college dormitories, all of which are co-educational; nor did Yale's refusal to exempt religious observ-
ers from co-educational housing violate the Fair Housing Act, 41 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. Because Yale is
so old that it came into being by a specific statute, the Hack court followed a 1995 Supreme Court case
setting forth the test for such a corporation: "[O]nly if (1) the government created the corporate entity
by special law, (2) the government created the entity to further governmental objectives, and (3) the
government retains 'permanent authority to appoint a majority of the directors of the corporation' will
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tion or the governing documents provide that some or all of the members of
the governing board are appointed by state officials (and perhaps are them-
selves designated officials, such as the governor, state legislators, or county
or city officials); that financing comes directly from the state or the state
makes assets available at low or no cost; and that, upon liquidation, the
charity's assets will be transferred to the state. An umbrella statute applica-
ble to all quasi-public bodies or the enabling statute itself might legiti-
mately constrain activities in some way, for example by requiring hiring
practices and compensation schedules to follow the rules for public em-
ployees. Conditions can also appear in the governing documents and con-
tracts or memoranda of understanding providing for governmental funding.
The issue of whether a grant-making foundation was a state actor
arose in the early 1970's when a private plaintiff alleged that thirteen chari-
table foundations in the Buffalo, New York area discriminated against him-
self, his children and his foundation in that the appellee "foundations
refused to hire him as a director of their foundations, refused to give schol-
arships to his children, and refused to grant money to his foundation, all for
reasons of race."'43 The plaintiff also alleged that the foundations pursued a
"pattern of discriminatory employment and investment." 44
A panel of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals refused to dismiss the
case. Nevertheless, it enumerated a list of factors for a finding that a private
entity amounts to a state actor:
(1) the degree to which the "private" organization is dependent on gov-
ernmental aid; (2) the extent and intrusiveness of the governmental regu-
latory scheme; (3) whether that scheme connotes government approval
of the activity or whether the assistance is merely provided to all without
such connotation; (4) the extent to which the organization serves a public
function or acts as a surrogate for the State; (5) whether the organization
has legitimate claims to recognition as a "private" organization in asso-
ciational or other constitutional terms. 45
However, the panel added: "The formulation of this definition of 'state
action' is applicable only to claims of racial discrimination. . . . [C]onduct
the corporation be deemed a government entity for the purpose of the state action requirement." 237
F.3d at 84 (citation omitted). The Hack court ruled, "[h]ere, the first two factors are easily satisfied: the
State of Connecticut created the corporate entity by special law, and higher education is a governmental
objective (although not the exclusive province of government). Two of nineteen board members is,
however, a long way from control." Id. at 84. Moreover, the court added, "It is equally clear that the
state could not control Yale's policies and operations even if it chose to become involved. Yale, as a
private university, did not act under color of law." Id.
43. Jackson v. Statler Found., 496 F.2d 623, 625 (2d Cir. 1974).
44. Id. at 625. Jackson "sought injunctive and declaratory relief, damages, the revocation of
appellees' tax exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code, and an order directing the foundations to
surrender all their assets to the United States Treasury." Id.
45. Id. at 629.
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which is admittedly part private and part governmental must be more
strictly scrutinized when claims of racial discrimination are made."'46
In remanding for further proceedings, the court found that the appellee
foundation enjoyed financial support from its tax treatment and was subject
to close regulation. Moreover, the panel wrote:
The exemptions in question are not the type of government assistance
such as police or fire protection, which is routinely provided to all with-
out any connotation of approval. Organizations must apply for exempt
status. Moreover, the acts of application and approval are not value neu-
tral. In effect, the government would appear to be certifying that every
foundation on its tax-exempt list is laboring in the public interest.47
Even when citing the Statler Foundation factors quoted above, the
courts almost always found the private entity not to be a state actor.48
Moreover, after Statler Foundation, the Supreme Court "has tightened the
proof required for a showing of state action. '49 Statler Foundation remains
an unusual case, perhaps because would-be beneficiaries of private philan-
thropy rarely have standing to sue for largess or over the tax-exempt status
of a nonprofit organization. 50 More significantly, the 1983 Supreme Court
decision in Bob Jones University v. United States has shifted the debate
over racially discriminatory schools from the question of whether these
entities violated private plaintiffs' rights -to whether the entities are entitled
to federal tax exemption under Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) as a
matter of public policy. 51 Indeed, Justice Powell's concurrence in Bob
Jones cited Judge Friendly's dissent to the Second Circuit's denial of a
rehearing en banc in Statler Foundation.52
Statler Foundation lives on more for Judge Friendly's blistering dis-
sent (joined by two of the three other dissenters) from the denial of a re-
hearing by the full Second Circuit. He has provided a cogent analysis for
46. Id. at 635.
47. Id. at 633 (citations and footnote omitted).
48. See, e.g., Gilinsky v. Columbia Univ., 488 F. Supp. 1309, 1312 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The Statler
Foundation suit itself eventually foundered when the pro se plaintiff failed to pursue the case. See
Jackson v. Statler Found., 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11389, 36 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 75-5579, 75-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) P9721 (W.D.N.Y. 1975).
49. Fulani v. League of Women Voters Educ. Fund, 684 F. Supp. 1185, 1191-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(citation omitted) (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011 (1982), Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457
U.S. 830, 842 (1982), and Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974)).
50. See generally Evelyn Brody, From the Dead Hand to the Living Dead: The Conundrum of
Charitable-Donor Standing, 41 Ga. L. REV. 1183 (2007).
51. See generally Myth 111, infra.
52. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 610 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote
omitted) ("Given the importance of our tradition of pluralism, '[the] interest in preserving an area of
untrammeled choice for private philanthropy is very great.' Jackson v. Statler Foundation, 496 F.2d
623, 639 (CA2 1974) (Friendly, J., dissenting from denial of reconsideration en banc).").
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why foundations and charities should not easily be declared to be state
actors. Beginning by observing the novelty of the plaintiffs claim, Judge
Friendly termed the panel opinion "the most ill-advised decision with re-
spect to 'state action' yet rendered by any court and unless corrected will
be the source of enormous damage to the great edifice of private philan-
thropy which has been one of this country's most distinctive and admirable
features. 53
Invoking the Supreme Court decision in Walz (discussed under Myth
III, below), Judge Friendly observed:
Because of its broad availability, a tax exemption, in itself, has never
previously been thought to impose the government's imprimatur suffi-
ciently to convert the recipient into a defacto arm of the government. An
exemption or other tax benefit, available to a wide range of institutions,
has always been regarded as the least possible form of government sup-
port, except for the police and fire protection provided all citizens. 54
Judge Friendly also dismissed the "the panel's reliance on the gov-
ernment's regulation of foundations to prevent abuse of the tax exemption."
He explained: "The 'state action' cases that have stressed the heavy pres-
ence of government regulation are those in which private institutions are
carrying out state policy against the plaintiffs or in which the state is bene-
fiting directly from the private activity."' 55 He commented tersely: "Private
action does not become state action simply because government regulation
has not gone so far as a plaintiff would like."'56
Judge Friendly was equally concerned with protecting the values of
foundation activity and practices and with the dangers of imposing artificial
governmental constraints on them:
The interest in preserving an area of untrammeled choice for private phi-
lanthropy is very great. Even among philanthropic institutions, the activi-
ties of charitable family foundations, receiving no government benefit
other than tax exemption, should be the last to be swept, under a "sifting
of facts and exercise of judgment," within the concept of state action.
There are hundreds of thousands of foundations ranging from the giants
to the pygmies. While most foundations, particularly large ones, give
mainly to institutions serving all races and creeds, although hardly in the
completely non-discriminatory way required of public institutions, I see
nothing offensive, either constitutionally or morally, in a foundation's
choosing to give preferentially or even exclusively to Jesuit seminaries,
to Yeshivas, to black colleges or to the NAACP. Indeed, I find it some-
53. Jackson, 496 F.2d at 637 (Friendly, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Judge
Friendly noted, however, that his dissent does not apply to the holding with respect to the defendant
Buffalo Foundation, id. at 637 n. 1, a majority of whose board is appointed by public officials.
54. Id. at 638.
55. Id. (footnote omitted).
56. Id. at 639.
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thing of a misnomer to apply the pejorative term "racial discrimination"
to a failure to make a charitable gift.57
Judge Friendly cautioned that "[d]onors are not going to be willing to
spend their time and money, or to have directors and staffs of foundations
spend theirs, in defending actions like this one. If the federal courts take
over the supervision of philanthropy, there will ultimately be no philan-
thropy to supervise. '58 Moreover, he expressed deep concern that "the de-
cision will spawn countless civil rights suits against charitable foundations
by disgruntled minority applicants, add unnecessarily to the crushing bur-
den on the district courts and the courts of appeals, and, worst of all, seri-
ously discourage private philanthropy by subjecting donors to the necessity
of justifying their decisions in court." Indeed, even the record of the "sev-
eral of the defendant foundations [that] commendably have given liberally
to black and other minority causes" will not save them or others "from the
necessity of full factual exploration and explanation of just what they have
done over the years, with the attendant burdens on foundation directors and
staffs and the courts."' 59
D. Foundations and Charities
are Generally Not Subject to Public Access Laws
Foundations and other charities might be subject to registration and
reporting rules, as well as to any regulation required because of a particular
industry in which they might operate. Separate is the issue of when state
Sunshine Laws granting the public access to governmental agencies-
allowing the public to access, attend meetings of, and obtain records-
apply or should apply to nonprofit organizations on the basis that they pur-
portedly function as quasi-governmental bodies. That is, separate from the
question of whether a quasi-public body is subject to constitutional con-
straints on its behavior is when public access laws apply or should apply to
foundations and charities.
Application of public access statutes has been frequently litigated.
Courts have no trouble rejecting suits that seek records held by typically
private institutions. Recently, for example, the high court of Massachusetts
ruled against application of the state public records law against Harvard.60
In situations that overlap with those just described, proponents assert that a
57. Id. at 639-40.
58. Id. at 640.
59. Id.
60. Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard Coll., 840 N.E.2d 518 (Mass.
2006).
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government that spins off the performance of government functions, or that
depends on a private organization to perform essential government func-
tions, cannot evade the public's access to information. Notably, media of-
ten probe contributions to state-institution-related private bodies, and what,
if anything, donors might be getting in return. 61 "State-institution-related
foundations" raise issues of private access to and control over public assets
(including such intangible assets as the public institution's name and
goodwill); their role in soliciting and managing gifts, investments, and
campus facilities; and their role in governance of the state institution (nota-
bly, the recent trend to supplement-if not pay the bulk of-the public
university president's salary). Most contentious is information about the
names and contribution levels of individual donors, who have a privacy
interest in protecting their wealth and supported causes. 62
Whether an entity is subject to state public access laws depends on
one or more, but usually a combination of, factors that include the follow-
ing: (1) whether the organization is primarily performing a public function,
including under agreements with government; (2) whether the organization
was created by specific statute; (3) whether the organization exercises
powers of government (such as enacting policies or rules that affect citizens
as citizens, or having the power to tax); (4) whether the board is comprised
of or appointed by public officials; (5) the extent to which state grants or
contracts comprise the entity's revenue stream; (6) whether a public agency
previously operated the facility or provided the specific services; (7)
whether action by government is necessary to dissolve or divest assets from
the entity; (8) whether the organization's employees are employed by gov-
61. For cases finding a nonprofit organization subject to the state's open records laws, see State ex
rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Univ. of Toledo Foundation, 602 N.E.2d 1159 (Ohio 1992) (finding defendant
is a "public office" and is required to produce names of donors); Gannon v. Board of Regents, 692
N.W.2d 31 (Iowa 2005) (similar); Champ v. Poelker, 755 S.W.2d 383, 390-93.(Mo. App. 1988) (find-
ing convention and visitors bureau performs public functions and is a quasi-governmental public body).
Most recently, in Cape Publications, Inc. v. University of Louisville Foundation, Inc., 260 S.W.3d 818
(K. 2008), the court declared the defendant to be a public agency that must disclose the names of 47,000
donors. While the court found that the public's interest in how the institution's fund-raising arm oper-
ates outweighs concerns for donors' privacy, the court upheld the privacy rights of sixty-two donors
who requested anonymity because, at the time of each of these anonymous donations, the courts had not
yet determined the status of the Foundation as a public entity for purposes of the Open Records Act. For
an unsuccessful suit, see, for example, Lee Publ'ns., Inc. v. Dickinson Sch. of Law, 848 A.2d 178 (Pa.
Comm'w. Ct. 2004) (rejecting a suit by a group of newspapers with respect to a nonprofit corporation
formed to monitor and enforce the terms of a merger of a private law school into a state university).
62. Following the Iowa decision in Gannon, cited in the previous footnote, in 2006 the Iowa
legislature amended the statute setting forth exceptions from disclosure. See IOWA CODE § 22.7(52)
(2009) (listing what information about donors to public colleges is and is not subject to public disclo-
sure). Compare id., with I.R.C. § 6104(b) (2008) (resolving the privacy/disclosure tension as follows:
Series Forms 990 returns are subject to public disclosure, including the information about donations
made to private foundations, but the identities of donors to public charities, while included in filings
with the IRS, are exempt from public disclosure).
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eminent and/or receive government benefits and/or can participate in pro-
grams sponsored by government for its employees; and (9) whether the
entity must comply with state audit or procurement requirements or must
maintain its money on deposit with the state. No one of these factors is
generally determinative for qualifying as a public or quasi-governmental
body.63
Most foundations and charities do not satisfy these factors or any rea-
sonable subset of them, and the factors and their underlying rational would
be misapplied if a blanket of "publicness" were to be thrown upon them.
Individual organizations that do satisfy enough of the factors become pub-
lic for purposes of the sunshine laws, as the cited cases attest. Moreover,
when particular nonprofits are found to be subject to a state Sunshine Law,
the courts first evaluated how the various factors described above applied
to the specific entity. They did not presume publicness, and, if anything,
the required fact-intensive analyses militate for a presumption of private-
ness that distinguishes foundations and charities from the state and its cor-
responding responsibilities.
III. MYTH III: FOUNDATION AND CHARITY ASSETS AND
RESOURCES ARE "PUBLIC MONEY" BECAUSE TAX-FAVORED
TREATMENT AMOUNTS TO A SUBSIDY ENTITLING GOVERNMENT TO
INTERJECT ITSELF IN THE GOVERNANCE OF FOUNDATIONS AND
OTHER CHARITIES, PASS JUDGMENT ON THEIR PROGRAMMATIC
AND OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS, AND OTHERWISE INTERFERE
WITH THEIR AUTONOMY, INDEPENDENCE, AND INTERNAL
DECISION-MAKING.
This Myth evolves from two tax policies. First, foundations and other
charities generally are not required to pay income, property, and other
taxes. 64 Second, donors who itemize their deductions are able to deduct the
value of their charitable contributions from their taxable income, within
certain limits. 65 As a result of these tax-favored treatments, government
forgoes taxes that would otherwise be collected on income or contributions
and must find other sources for this lost revenue from other taxpayers.
Consequently, Myth III continues, these forgone amounts constitute a sub-
63. For example, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that an organization was not public
even though created pursuant to a state enabling statute, it receive dedicated funds from public sources,
and the board includes public servants or people appointed by those in government. See Ill. Clean
Energy Cmty. Found. v. Filan, 392 F.3d 934 (7th Cir. 2004), discussed at the end of Part 11.B, supra.
64. I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3) and 509(a)..
65. I.R.C. § 170.
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sidy from the government, which makes government (and the public) a co-
contributor to these enterprises. This Myth concludes that, as a co-
contributor, government (and the public) is justified in dictating choice or
focus of mission, mandating details of governance, making judgments
about programmatic and operational effectiveness, and intervening in other
aspects of internal operations of foundations and other charities.
A corollary to Myth III is the belief that, in exchange for tax benefits,
foundations and other charities must deliver services or (in some cases)
products that would otherwise be the responsibility of government. At a
minimum, this quid pro quo thinking demands that the nonprofit sector
provide quantifiable, objective benefits for the public in an amount that is
at least equal to the forgone taxes. 66 Variations of this corollary seek to
impose quotas or fair-share expectations for the return on the subsidy that
must serve their specific charitable causes to some meaningful degree.67
Alternatively, some variants try to ensure that the subsidy is not used to
more than an unspecified degree for charitable purposes believed to be
unacceptable, even though meeting long-held standards for charitability.68
A. Myth Debunked
This argument is classified as myth for at least five independent rea-
sons. Whether individually or in the aggregate, the positions set forth below
militate against treating foundation and charitable assets as public money,
much less referring to them as such. More important than the semantic
distinction, however, is that the positions below emphasize the innate au-
thority of foundations and other charities to make and implement decisions
on governance, structure, mission, performance, and other aspects of their
operations, provided such decisions are in pursuit of charitable purposes
and otherwise comply with the law.
1.This Myth overstates the covenant that attaches to the tax-favored
treatment. Generally, the covenant is that assets of foundations and other
charities must be dedicated to and used in furtherance of recognized chari-
66. See Suzanne Perry, Paying It Forward-and Back, THE CHRONICLE OF PHILANTHROPY, Sept.
9, 2008 (citing Hon. Xavier Becerra and Sen. Charles Grassley), available at
http://www.jewishresearch.org/v2/2008/articles/philanthropy/9-4-08.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
67. See Makani Themba-Nixon, Can Counting Really Make the Difference?, I CRITICAL ISSUES
FORUM 14 (2008); Arturo Vargas, Philanthropic Initiative for Racial Equity, 1 CRITICAL ISSUES
FORUM 16 (2008); Pablo Eisenberg and John Gamboa, Hudson Institute Bradley Center for Philan-
thropy and Civic Renewal Forum: Mandating Cultural Munificence?, available at
http://www.hudson.org/files/pdfLupload/Transcript-2008_04_07.pdf (Apr. 7, 2008). See also JOEL
FLEISHMAN, THE FOUNDATION: A GREAT AMERICAN SECRET; How PRIVATE WEALTH IS CHANGING
THE WORLD 52 (2007).
68. See NAT'L COMM. FOR RESPONSIVE PHILANTHROPY, supra note 6.
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table, tax-exempt purposes and may not be used for private purposes. Addi-
tionally, nothing in the legislative history of the tax exemption or charitable
deduction substantiates tax-favored treatment as a way for government or
the public to intrude on the autonomy and independence of fundamentally
private enterprises.
2.Tax-favored treatment for foundations and other charities and their
donors is not qualitatively different from deductions, tax credits, and other
forms of tax-favored treatment afforded individuals and businesses, whose
assets and enterprises are not thereby deemed public, nor are those taxpay-
ers treated as if they possessed or were responsible for public money.
3. This Myth seeks to involve government in the affairs of foundations
and charities to degrees greater than when government engages with pri-
vate entities in more direct ways, such as with government grants or con-
tracts.
4.The doctrine of "unconstitutional conditions" limits the ability of
government to interfere with the governance and operations of foundations
and other charities.
5.This Myth ignores the fact that foundation and other charity assets
consist mostly of private contributions and privately earned funds dedicated
to charitable, tax-exempt purposes.
B. The covenant that attaches to the tax-favored treatment under law and
public policy mandates that assets be dedicated to and used in furtherance
of charitable purposes and may not be used for private benefit.
The federal tax exemption for foundations and other charities derives
from § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. The statute identifies the
form of organizations that are exempt if they are organized and operated
for certain specifically described purposes, provided that there is no im-
permissible private benefit, no more than insubstantial effort to influence
legislation,69 and no attempt to intervene in political campaigns. The de-
ductibility of charitable contributions is found at Code § 170, which essen-
tially repeats these criteria.
There is an ongoing debate about the purported reasons for enacting
and maintaining the tax-favored treatment for foundations and charities,
including whether that benefit is properly categorized as a subsidy or rec-
69. The limitations on foundations' ability to influence legislation are more restrictive than are the




ognition that charitable income falls outside the proper tax base. 70 There
are also those who believe that tax-favored treatment is justified because
these organizations serve higher purposes that should be encouraged as a
matter of law and policy and that should not be inhibited financially by
taxing them on their charitable activities. 71 However justified, tax exemp-
tion for charities and deductions for donors results in reduced tax revenues
for government.
It is that apparently lost tax revenue that prompts the quidpro quo ap-
proach to exemption and deduction. Under the narrowest conception of this
approach, the state bestows exemption because charities lessen the burdens
of government, for which the reciprocal obligation of the entity is to under-
take that which is the obligation of government. 72 Such a rationale, how-
ever, fails to address some important types of exempt entities whose
activities are not a responsibility of government-not just churches, in
whose activities government is constitutionally prohibited from engaging,
but also many associational and other exempt organizations. Neither the
charitable deduction nor the income-tax exemption is limited to those or-
ganizations that lessen the burdens of government. 73 Even broader applica-
tions of quid pro quo thinking generally look principally to a type of
monetary exchange and neglect intangible benefits provided by foundations
70. See Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax Exemption,
23 J. CORP. L. 585, 595 (1998). Note that while the "tax expenditure budget" prepared by the U.S.
Congress's Joint Committee on Taxation calculates the forgone taxes from the charitable-contribution
deduction and from tax-exempt bonds issued by nonprofit hospitals and educational institutions, it
views the income-tax exemption of charities as part of the properly determined base. Thus, current
federal tax policy for charitable activity combines subsidy and base-defining approaches.
71. See John Colombo, The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable Contributions Deduc-
tion: Integrating Theories for the Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 657, 682
n. 124 (2001) (discussing War Revenue Act of 1917 and citing Senator Hollis).
72. See Nina J. Crimm, An Explanation of the Federal Income Tax Exemption for Charitable
Organizations: A Theory of Risk Compensation, 50 FLA. L. REv. 419, 430 and n.34 (1998) (citing H.R.
Rep. No. 75-1860, at 19 (1938)); John D. Colombo, Why Is Harvard Tax-Exempt? (And Other Myster-
ies of Tax Exemption for Private Educational Institutions), 35 ARIZ. L. REv. 841, 862 (1993) (citations
omitted); Laurens Williams & Donald V. Moorehead, An Analysis of the Federal Tax Distinctions
Between Public and Private Charitable Organizations, 4 FILER COMM'N RESEARCH PAPERS, supra
note 3, at 2099-2129, 2112 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1860, 75th Cong, 1st Sess. 20 (1938)).
73. State property-tax regimes increasingly require an exempt charity to reduce the burdens of
government as well as to provide some (unspecified) level of benefits to those who cannot afford the
charity's fees. See Evelyn Brody, The States' Growing Use of a Quid-Pro-Quo Rationale for the Char-
ity Property Tax Exemption, 56 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 269 (2007). In whatever form, the subsidy
theory places charities in a position subordinate to the state, which can decide the parameters of its
burdens. The Supreme Court suggested that to the extent the state is unhappy with or simply uninter-
ested in subsidizing certain activities, the state can fine-tune the property-tax exemption. Camps New-
found/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 598-600 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See
generally PROPERTY-TAX EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES: MAPPING THE BATTLEFIELD (Evelyn Brody ed.,
Urban Institute Press, 2002).
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and charities by asking only the limited question: "what are we/society
getting in return for the tax favored treatment?" 74
Each of the major theories seeking to justify exemption similarly ap-
pears oversimplified and incomplete. Each theory seems unable to explain
at least some aspect of current and even historic law in this area. Why, as a
matter of tax policy, are exemption and deductibility of contributions avail-
able only to organizations and not also to individuals for charitable activi-
ties? 75 If exemption is a subsidy for providing charitable activity, why limit
lobbying or ban political activity when legislative or even political change
might most efficiently accomplish a charitable purpose? The most thorough
analysis of the very complicated U.S. tax treatment of foundations and
other charities groups a variety of policy goals under four headings dubbed
the support function (subsidy), the equity function (notably redistribution),
the regulatory function (constraints on managerial behavior), and the bor-
der patrol function (that is, between charities and both the business and
public sectors). 76
Of course, one reason for some of the theoretical difficulties is the ab-
sence of substance in the legislative record about why Congress permitted
exemptions and charitable deductions in the first place. This vacuum has
resulted in theories being developed and documented after the fact. On the
other hand, some posit that the void is not remarkable at all but instead
reflects deference to the conviction that exemption for certain purposes is
self-evident. 77
74. See Howard Husock, Nobody Does it Better, WALL ST. J, Oct. 24, 2008, at WI3, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122480190174464653.html; Editorial, Ray D. Madoff, Dog Eat Your
Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/09/opinion/09madoff.htrnl?_r=l;
Perry, supra note 66 (citing Hon. Xavier Becerra and Sen. Charles Grassley). Interestingly, no court
following a quid-pro-quo rationale for exemption-notably the Supreme Court's decisions in Walz v.
Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970), and in Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S.
540, 544 (1983)-has quantified the degree to which the public gain must equate or relate to the for-
gone tax revenue.
75. Colombo, supra note 71, at 678, 682. There are practical explanations for not allowing deduc-
tions for contributions to individuals and not allowing individual income to be tax-exempt. For instance,
it is harder to hold an individual accountable for ensuring that they pursue charitable purposes and that
they do not engage in private benefit; the current systems' inefficiencies are the price of achieving a
higher degree of oversight and accountability.
76. John Simon, Harvey Dale & Laura Chisolm, The Federal Tax Treatment of Charitable Or-
ganizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 267-306 (Walter W. Powell &
Richard Steinberg, eds., Yale University Press, 2006).
77. Borris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Fed-
eral Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 301 (1976) ("But neither upon their initial enactment nor
during the ensuing decades have these exemptions elicited more than cursory legislative explanation,
save for matters of technical detail. Commentators have been almost equally silent. These decades of
benign neglect may have reflected a conviction that the wisdom of tax exemption was self-evident, that
the basic policy was politically invulnerable to change, or that taxation in this area would bring in little
revenue."). See also GEORGE S. BOUTWELL, A MANUAL OF THE DIRECT AND EXCISE TAX SYSTEM OF
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The history that does exist contains a desire expressed in conjunction
with passage of the first American income tax in 1874 that exempt organi-
zations should not "suffer under the bill"; similarly, the 1917 enactment of
a deduction for charitable contributions was justified by the burden that
high wartime marginal tax rates imposed on generous donors who might no
longer be able to support the equally-patriotic Red Cross. 78 In any event,
the legislative history is clear that there was no "original bargain" that can
be pinpointed. In many ways, the absence of a single, comprehensive ex-
planation for the exemptions and charitable deduction, and the dearth of
specific legislative history, support giving due deference to longevity and
an appropriate unwillingness to discount long-standing, centuries-old prac-
tices and policies that still work. Moreover, the absence of an explanation
implicitly recognizes that foundations and charities benefit society in finan-
cial and nonfinancial ways that are of extraordinary importance that should
be encouraged and not disturbed lightly.79
Instead of focusing on the debate (after the fact) and speculating about
whether tax-favored treatment constitutes a subsidy, the more important
question for our purposes in addressing this Myth III is the nature of the
obligations or conditions imposed on and accepted by foundations, chari-
ties, and their respective donors who benefit from the tax-favored treat-
ment. Most obviously, in return for exemption and the privilege of
receiving deductible contributions, organizations must commit their mis-
sions and operations to charitable purposes under the requirement of the
Internal Revenue Code and corresponding regulations. While Congress can
remove exemption from a class of charities, the starting point for defining
THE UNITED STATES 275, 275-276 (1863), citing Commissioner Decision 110 (May 1863) ("The
income of literary, scientific, or other charitable institutions, in the hands of trustees or others, is not
subject to income tax."); Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax Exemp-
tion, supra note 70, at 605-06 ("The first federal income tax statute [see Boutwell, supra], enacted to
finance the Civil War, applied only to individuals, and exempted trustees of charitable trusts. Just a year
later, however, a revenue-hungry Congress expanded the income tax and extended an excise tax to
corporations, making no general exemption available to charities. However, when Congress enacted a
broad income-tax statute in 1894, without explanation it exempted all charities from tax. Again in the
corporate excise tax statute of 1909, Congress exempted charities. This time Congress explicitly con-
sidered the possibility of a surplus-generating activity, and as a condition of exemption imposed a
prohibition on the 'inurement' of the entity's profits to the private benefit of any person."); Chauncey
Belknap, The Federal Income Tax Exemption of Charitable Organizations: Its History and Underlying
Policy, 4 FILER COMM'N RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 3, at 2025.
78. See John A. Wallace & Robert W. Fisher, The Charitable Deduction Under Section 170 of the
Internal Revenue Code, 4 FILER COMM'N RESEARCH PAPERS, supra note 3, at 2131. See also Colombo,
supra note 71, at 682.
79. Atkinson refers to "metabenefits" to society derived from the way in which foundations and
charities produce their goods or deliver their services. Rob Atkinson, Theories of the Federal Income
Tax Exemption for Charities: Thesis, Antithesis, and Syntheses, 27 STETSON L. REv. 395, 402-03
(1997) (among these metabenefits are a spirit of volunteerism, pluralism, initiative, experimentation,
and an educated population).
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charitable purposes under Code § 501(c)(3) is broad, as described under
Myth I, above; for the restrictions on lobbying and political activity, see
Part II.E, below.
Public charities must comply with the requirements of Internal Reve-
nue Code § 4958 to ensure against excess benefit transactions. Private
foundations operate under additional regiments that include a mandatory
minimum payout rate; a one- or two-percent tax on investment income;
disclosure of specific investment activities and the identities of donors as
part of their information tax return; and prohibitions on self-dealing trans-
actions (other than the payment of reasonable compensation for services),
excess business holdings, jeopardy investments, and certain other transac-
tions, such as impermissible lobbying and political activity. 80 Exempt or-
ganizations also agree to public disclosure requirements designed to allow
government and the public to hold those entities accountable for their obli-
gations. Among these requirements are filing an information tax return
about their finances and activities and making that return publicly avail-
able. 81
While the wisdom, design or extent of these statutory constraints
could be debated, they are legitimate within a tax exemption system de-
fined by the specific terms of § 501(c)(3) focused on charitable activities
rather than private ones. However, these restrictions do not otherwise im-
pinge on foundation and other charity governance, structure, effectiveness,
and decision-making-matters that are internal to the organizations and
generally committed to their discretion as autonomous, independent enti-
ties.
Therefore, to the extent a covenant between Congress (and states to
the extent of corollary positions) and foundations and charities does exist, it
may be summarized as follows: Organizations exempt from taxation and
that receive charitable contributions for which donors receive deductions
commit under § 501(c)(3) to using their resources and assets to further
charitable, exempt purposes and not private benefit, including compliance
with statutes and regulations that provide more detailed guidance about
what constitutes charitable activity and what may not. As a subset of that
overall commitment, such organizations also must provide information
relevant to demonstrating their specific compliance with § 501(c)(3). As a
matter of law, the covenant does not compromise, threaten, or undermine
the genetic character of these organizations as private creatures of state law
entitled to autonomy and independence.
80. See I.R.C. ch. 42.
81. I.R.C. §§ 6033, 6104.
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C. Individuals and for-profit businesses also receive tax-favored treat-
ment, but their assets and resources are not thereby considered public, nor
do tax benefits render such individuals or businesses
governmental entities.
Throughout American history, governments at all levels have used tax
abatements and other incentives to encourage certain activities. 82 Early
state governments made no sectoral distinctions in bestowing or withhold-
ing tax subsidies: New England canal, turnpike, bridge and manufacturing
companies enjoyed the same tax exemption extended to eleemosynary enti-
ties such as Yale College. In the first wave of tax reform under President
Ronald Reagan, certain sectors of the business community enjoyed nega-
tive income tax rates through the combination of accelerated depreciation
and investment tax credits on new equipment. The ongoing multi-billion-
dollar (if not multi-trillion-dollar) rescue of the financial, housing, and
automobile sectors dwarfs public subsidies provided to nonprofit organiza-
tions83-but organizations in these industries are not viewed as governmen-
tal, and any limits on their independence are not derived solely from tax-
favored treatment.
The list is long of tax-favored treatments-such as deductions, exclu-
sions from income, credits, exemptions, abatements, deferrals-that vari-
ous levels of government afford to individuals and business, for reasons
other than the proper measurement of income, without impacting the under-
lying autonomy and private nature of the beneficiaries of such treatment.
Individuals, for example, enjoy deductions for mortgage interest and prop-
erty taxes paid on their homes, exclusion of all or most gain on the sale of
their principal residence, deductions or exclusions for retirement contribu-
tions, health insurance, and tuition, as well as tax credits for higher educa-
tion, dependent care, and children. 84 Government and the public do not
become entitled to dictate lifestyle, consumption or savings patterns, child
82. See Evelyn Brody, Institutional Dissonance in the Nonprofit Sector, 41 VILL. L. REv. 433, 440
(1996).
83. See Government Accountability Office, GAO-09-193, Nonprofit Sector: Significant Federal
Funds Reach the Sector through Various Mechanisms, but More Complete and Reliable Funding Data
are Needed (GAO-09-193) (2009), available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d09193.pdf (last visited Feb.
21, 2010).
84. See Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditure Analysis and Constitutional Decisions, 50 HASTINGS L.J.
407, 416 (1999) (noting that tax expenditure analysis challenges us to analyze the home mortgage
deduction, child tax credit, earned income tax). Other examples include the following: exclusion of
scholarships from income, IRC § 117; tuition tax credit, IRC § 25A; limited interest deduction for
educational loans, IRC § 221, interest exclusion for Education Savings Bonds used for tuition pay-
ments, IRC § 135(a). See Colombo, supra note 71, at 660 n.12; Evelyn Brody, Charities in Tax Reform:
Threats to Subsidies Overt and Covert, 66 TENN. L. REV. 687 (1999).
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bearing and rearing choices, furniture tastes, college major or course of
study, or to make any other decisions for the individuals who claim such
deductions and credits.
Similarly, businesses benefit from tax-favored treatment designed to
encourage certain activities deemed by the legislative body to be in the
public interest and worthy of public support. Examples of tax provisions
not necessary for the proper measurement of business profits include the
research and experimentation tax credit, accelerated depreciation deduc-
tions for equipment investment, tax credits for activities deemed "green,"
and tax benefits associated with economic development activities such as
tax increment financing. Government and the public do not thereby become
entitled to determine the nature of the underlying research or strategies
regarding exploitation of results, the timing for upgrading equipment,
whether to merge with a competitor or draw down a line of credit, whether
the board should have five or nine directors, or if the organization is doing
well or poorly. Indeed, nothing inherent in this tax-favored treatment is
even contingent on the businesses being efficiently or effectively run.
Likewise, it is not the tax-favored treatment that for-profits receive
that justifies or even supports the regulation of business. Laws and regula-
tions with respect to such areas as securities, banking, and the environment
do not depend on tax-favored treatment. For instance, securities and com-
modities trading laws and regulations arose because these markets func-
tioned in an uneven playing field that threatened the underlying stability of
the market as a whole. 85 Sarbanes-Oxley arose because significant fraudu-
lent behavior destroyed prominent businesses and the accompanying jobs,
savings, and investments and had nothing to do with tax treatment. In the
wake of the 2008 economic meltdown, the discussions of greater regulation
of the banking industry have involved not the tax preferences enjoyed by
the industry but rather the behavior of the banks themselves and govern-
ment as explicit shareholder, bondholder, and/or creditor. The current dis-
cussion about regulating executive compensation in the banking industry is
tied directly to avoiding the poor incentives that led to a near collapse of
the financial sector.
Recipients of a tax benefit are usually obligated to demonstrate that
they actually undertook the activity or incurred the expense giving rise to
the tax-favored treatment. Nothing else is compromised by the tax treat-
ment, and the taxpayers' assets are not deemed public, nor are the taxpay-
ers deemed to become public as a result. There is no compelling reason to
85. See THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION (1984).
[Vol 85:2
FOUNDATION AND CHARITY AUTONOMY
hold foundations or other charities to a different standard with regard to
their autonomy, privacy, independence, and decision-making. For the most
part, then, and consistent with tax-favored treatment afforded other sectors,
the quid pro quo for beneficial tax treatment is for foundations and chari-
ties to use the funds for charitable, exempt purposes, and to document and
report that they have done so. It does not mean that government or the pub-
lic can dictate mission or methods or impose sanctions or rewards for levels
of effectiveness.
D. Myth III seeks to involve government and the public in the affairs of
foundations and charities to degrees greater than when government en-
gagement with private entities is more direct, such as in the case ofgov-
ernment grants or contracts.
Harvard University's longest serving President, Charles W. Eliot, in
the 1870s labeled as "sophistical and fallacious" the assertion that "to ex-
empt an institution from taxation is the same thing as to grant it money
directly from the public treasury." 86 While the Supreme Court elsewhere
has referred to tax-exemption as a subsidy, in Walz v. Tax Commission, the
Court described exemptions and deductions as "qualitatively different"
from general subsidies, direct grants, and contracts with government. 87 The
net effect on the public treasury may be the same, but the decision-makers
and what happens in each instance are very different. These differences
deserve attention because similar effect on the treasury should not auto-
matically equate with the same treatment in other areas, much less assign-
ing harsher treatment to tax benefits involving the least government
involvement.
With regard to decision-making, exemptions and deductions involve
very little engagement by government, whose involvement is fundamen-
tally passive. With regard to the charitable-contribution deduction, the do-
nor (not government) makes decisions about which organizations receive or
do not receive contributions and any designations or restrictions that might
accompany the donation. 88 Nor does exemption involve any decision to
86. Belknap, supra note 77, at 2038 (quoting Harvard's President Charles Eliot).
87. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 690-91 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
The tax-exempt bond subsidy, likewise, is not akin to a direct expenditure. See Steele v. Indus. Dev.
Bd., 301 F.3d 401, 413 (6th Cir. 2002) (ruling that the tax-exempt bonds issued to a religious university
to construct a library dominate by religious literature "are analogous to an indirect financial benefit
conferred by a religiously neutral tax or deduction").
88. See FLEISHMAN, supra note 67, at 22 (benefit of exemptions and deductions "rather than direct
government subsidies" allows individuals to make choices about directing their support "rather than
through the haggling and logrolling of politically elected legislative bodies or the choices of a particular
governmental administration, Congress, or agency").
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favor specifically identified organizations. A distinguished foundation
commentator astutely observed that exemptions "insulate private charitable
enterprises from the government domination which is invited by the alter-
native method of direct grants by government." 89
Contrast these with true subsidies and government grants and con-
tracts in which government personnel affirmatively decide which organiza-
tions receive how much money, for which purposes, and subject to what
restrictions. In Walz, the Supreme Court characterized general subsidies as
"pregnant with involvement" by government, a description that aptly ap-
plies to government grants and contracts as well.90 In that case, concurring
Justice Brennan explained the distinction between direct subsidies and tax
exemption as follows: "A subsidy involves the direct transfer of public
monies to the subsidized taxpayers as a whole. An exemption, on the other
hand, involves no such transfer. It assists the exempted enterprise only
passively, by relieving a privately funded venture of the burden of paying
taxes." 91 Justice Brennan explained that direct subsidies involve govern-
ment "forcibly" diverting the income of taxpayers to the recipient, whereas
exemption involves government "merely refrain[ing] from diverting to its
own uses income independently generated... through voluntary contribu-
tions."92
Tax-favored treatment of charity--even if an economic subsidy-
should not imply the same government involvement and control that can
properly accompany a government grant or contract. In the case of grants
and contracts, nonprofit and for-profit organizations affirmatively exercise
their independence and autonomy in deciding to accept the terms of the
grant or contract, perhaps at the price of compromising decisions they
would otherwise make. Ultimately, they return to full autonomy, privacy,
and independence upon completion of their grant or contractual obliga-
tions. For example, any number of for-profit defense, aeronautic, and space
contractors generate all or substantially all of their revenues from govern-
ment contracts. These entities may be required to behave in certain ways to
fulfill requirements imposed by the specific government grant or contract
(such as letting bids for subcontracts, engaging percentages of minority- or
89. Belknap, supra note 77, at 2038.
90. Walz, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970) ("Obviously a direct money subsidy would be a relationship
pregnant with involvement and, as with most governmental grant programs, could encompass sustained
and detailed administrative relationships for enforcement of statutory or administrative standards, but
that is not this case."). Walz involved a challenge to property-tax exemption for churches, which the
state could not directly fund because of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
91. Id. at 690-91 (Brennan, J., concurring).
92. Id. (citations omitted).
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women-owned businesses, or even adopting certain fiscal controls), and
they may be required to publicly report information about the specific con-
tracts that would otherwise be private. Similarly, nonprofit social-service
organizations that accept more than $500,000 in government grants or con-
tracts agree to be subject to the Single Audit Act, among other require-
ments. Like government-funded entities, whether for-profit or nonprofit,
tax-exempt organizations' assets are not thereby public, and, like entities
directly funded by government, they retain fundamental control over their
governance, decision-making, and policies in furtherance of charitable
purposes.93
E. Tax benefits and even direct grants are protected from unconstitu-
tional conditions demanded by government.
The American system of government is founded on certain core, bed-
rock principles, one of which is that government itself is and must be lim-
ited, particularly with respect to intruding on individual and private rights.
The Founding Fathers carved essential elements of the Constitution from a
classical liberalism that charged government with preserving liberty and
not burdening it, that distrusted government, and that placed its faith in
"individual actions.., left untrammeled. ' '94 These virtues apply to benefit
93. See Pifer, supra note 5, at 54-55 ("Throughout our history we have believed in pluralism and
have practiced it. We have recognized that the nation's public purposes are considerably more extensive
in scope than its governmental purposes, and, through the aegis of the state, we have enabled a wide
variety of private institutions, including foundations, to be chartered to accomplish certain public,
though nongovernmental, purposes. We have also, through the aegis of the state, given tax exemption to
these institutions to facilitate their work and have regarded this as being eminently in the public interest.
Therefore, to attribute the public stake in the foundation to its tax-exempt status or to regard this status
as a 'privilege' is wholly erroneous. It is, in Professor Milton Katz's pithy phrase, 'to mistake an effect
for a cause.').
Compare the requirement in Australia that for a charitable body to be to tax exempt, it must be inde-
pendent of government. For a discussion of boundary between government and charities, see the High
Court decision in Central Bayside General Practice Association, Ltd. v. Commissioner of State Reve-
nue, [2006] HCA 43, 40 (Aug. 31, 2006) ("The mere fact that the appellant and the government both
have a purpose of improving patient care and health does not establish that the appellant has the purpose
of giving effect to government purposes, abdicating any independent fulfilment of its own. The appel-
lant's purpose is charitable. It remains charitable even though the government is the source of the funds
it uses to carry out that purpose. Its consent to the attachment by the government of conditions to the
employment of those funds does not establish that the appellant is not independently carrying out its
purpose.").
94. Belknap, supra note 77, at 2031 (noting that exemption "probably" developed in America
from widely present political philosophy in spirit of classical liberalism, the "dominant tenets" of which
"were distrust of government and faith that the progress and well-being of mankind could best be
achieved by natural forces harmonizing the individual actions of men who were left untrammeled.").
See also Heather Higgins, To Whom Does Your Money Belong?, Editorial, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2008,
at A16 ("As Thomas Jefferson put it, 'A wise and frugal government, which shall leave men free to
regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of labor and
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the nonprofit sector too. Federal appellate court Judge Richard Posner
warned about the danger of the IRS's being able to revoke exemption sim-
ply because it disagrees with a decision of a nonprofit entity's manage-
ment, without a finding that fiduciary duties have been breached. 95
When engaged in direct grant-making and contracting, the government
may generally choose the message it wishes to express, either directly or by
funding the speech of others. A government grant or contract is not a con-
stitutional right; thus, the government may condition such a benefit on the
recipient's waiver of otherwise available constitutional rights, notably in-
cluding the rights of free speech and association. However, the Constitution
provides an outer limit to the conditions that governments can impose on
grants or contract benefits. Under the Supreme Court's doctrine of "uncon-
stitutional conditions," while the state may condition a government grant or
contract on the affected party's waiver of otherwise available constitutional
rights-notably, exercise of free speech and associational rights-the state
may limit only what a grantee does with money provided directly by gov-
ernment.96 For example, the government may condition a contract on the
charity's not engaging in lobbying with contract funds, but may not use the
contract to ban lobbying by the charity with its other funds. 97
Similarly, tax exemption is not a constitutional right, and so imposing
conditions on tax-exempt status does not generally give rise to the argu-
ment of unconstitutional conditions. The Constitution grants broad latitude
to the federal government and the states in designing tax schemes that offer
exemptions to charities (including churches). Notably, the Supreme Court
upheld Congress' refusal to allow § 501(c)(3) organizations the right to
engage in more than insubstantial lobbying and in any political campaign
bread it has earned-this is the sum of good government."'), available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 122541316091086509.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
95. See Evelyn Brody, A Taxing Time for the Bishop Estate: What Is the I.R.S. Role in Charity
Governance?, 21 U. HAW. L. REv. 537, 583 n.152 (1999) (quoting Judge Posner in United Cancer
Council, Inc. v. Comm'r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1178-79 (7th Cir. 1999)).
96. In applying the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to a federal funding decision, the
Supreme Court in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), upheld federal rules prohibiting federally
funded family-planning programs from providing abortion counseling, because the grantee "can con-
tinue to perform abortions, provide abortion-related services, and engage in abortion advocacy...
through programs that are separate and independent from the project that receives Title X funds." Id. at
196. See generally Richard Epstein, Foreword to the Supreme Court, 1987 Term: Unconstitutional
Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1988); Kathleen M. Sulli-
van, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1413 (1989); Conference Papers from Emana-
tions from Rust: The Impact on the Nonprofit Sector of the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions,
National Center on Philanthropy and Law, New York University School of Law (1992).
97. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006) (commonly known as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, prohibiting discrimination under federally assisted programs on grounds of race, color, or na-
tional origin); 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006) (commonly known as Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972, prohibiting sex discrimination by federally funded schools).
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activity. Importantly, though, the Court's decision in Regan v. Taxation
With Representation98 was based on the authority of a § 501(c)(3) organi-
zation to create an affiliated § 501 (c)(4) organization to engage in lobbying
for the affiliated nonprofit group. 99 As a result, charitable activity-
including advocacy activity that does not amount to lobbying or political
activity--can be supported by tax-deductible charitable contributions, but
the (c)(4)'s lobbying activity will not.
The unconstitutional conditions cases "involve situations in which the
government has placed a condition on the recipient of the subsidy rather
than on a particular program or service, thus effectively prohibiting the
recipient from engaging in the protected conduct outside the scope of the
federally funded program." 100 A condition that the grantee give up the right
to structure and govern itself as it sees fit-for example, by requiring that
all directors be elected by members in a democratic process-could im-
pinge on the grantees' First Amendment rights of expressive association. 101
Practical difficulties might be more of an impediment. For example, if
Congress were to impose a minimum and maximum board size on non-
profit corporations, we could expect foundations to form as or convert to
charitable trusts, perhaps with a single trustee. The foregoing discussion of
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, however, was necessarily sim-
plistic, given that the courts have not set out a complete framework for
it. 102
98. 461 U.S. 540 (1983). The Court distinguished Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), which
ruled as an "unconstitutional condition" California's requirement that anyone seeking property tax
exemption must sign a declaration stating that he did not advocate the forcible overthrow of the Gov-
ernment of the United States. The Speiser court declared that "[to] deny an exemption to claimants who
engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech." Id. at 518. By contrast,
declared Taxation With Representation: "Congress has merely refused to pay for the lobbying out of
public moneys. This Court has never held that Congress must grant a benefit such as TWR claims here
to a person who wishes to exercise a constitutional right." 461 U.S. at 545.
99. And, if desired, the § 501(c)(4) organization can create a separate segregated fund or political
action committee (PAC) under § 527 to engage in political activity.
100. Rust, 500U.S. at 197.
101. A Maine legislative proposal, applicable to nonprofit corporations receiving at least twenty-
five percent of their total funding from one or more municipal, county, state or federal sources, would
prohibit compensating an officer or director in excess of $250,000 per year. In addition, excessive
compensation of a director or officer is added as a ground to dissolution pursuant to court order. March
29, 2007, available in LEXIS at 2007 ME S.B. 636. As enacted, though, the state merely adopted a
requirement that a "public benefit corporation that receives at least twenty-five percent of its total
funding from one or more municipal, county, state or federal sources shall provide to the public infor-
mation about the total compensation paid by the corporation to any director or officer of the corporation
if the compensation exceeds $250,000 in any twelve-month period. The corporation shall make the
information available by posting the information on its publicly accessible website or through other
comparable means. 'Compensation' includes all remuneration and benefits." Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.
13-B, § 713.A(2-A) (2005).
102. See Simon, Dale & Chisolm, note 76 supra, at 276 ("Because governmental conditions on
benefits may reach further than direct government proscriptions, and because any level of govern-
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F. Myth III presumes that all foundation and other charity assets are
public despite the fact that such assets consist mostly ofprivate funds.
The tax exemption and contribution deduction permit foundations and
other charities to use money that would presumably otherwise be paid into
the public treasury. Efforts to dictate these organizations' governance and
activities, beyond requiring that their purposes and activities be charitable,
seem most often to rely on this fact. At least three points frequently get lost
with this myth. First, there is an overwhelming part of the charitable deduc-
tion, likely to be substantially more than half of it, that would not have
been paid to Treasury in any event. This point is discussed further below.
Second, but for the magnanimity and generosity of the donor, the funds at
issue might not have been dedicated to charitable purposes at all, thereby
denying society the benefit of these resources. This is related to the third
frequently forgotten point, which is that donors may implement any num-
ber of tax planning strategies or make other choices regarding the funds
such that there is no guarantee that the tax revenue lost from the charitable
deduction would have found its way to the public treasury.
With regard to the first point, as a threshold matter, individual taxpay-
ers can deduct their contributions only if they itemize their deductions (and
only about a third of taxpayers do). At the other extreme, a donor whose
gifts exceed a certain percentage of income must carry forward the excess
(and an unused carryforward expires after five years). 10 3 Otherwise, the
"price" of giving varies by the taxpayer's marginal tax rate, and so there is
no tax justification for claiming as public money the amount of the dona-
tion in excess of the donor's applicable tax rate. An example might help. A
charitable donation of $100 by a donor in a 35-percent marginal tax bracket
allows the donor to save $35 in taxes (absent application of other tax rules).
The balance of $65 would not have been paid to Treasury and remains
"private" money.
ment-federal, state, or local-may impose them, the much-needed clarification of the parameters of
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is likely to require years if not decades of additional litigation
and scholarship.").
103. Simplifying the rules of I.R.C. § 170, if the donee is a public charity, then cash contributions
may reduce the donor's adjusted gross income (AGI) by up to fifty-percent. If the donee is a private
foundation, then cash contributions may reduce AGI by up to only thirty-percent. If instead the donor
contributes appreciated capital assets and deducts fair market value rather than basis, then the percent-
age-of-income limit is thirty-percent for a public charity donee and twenty-percent for a private founda-
tion. Furthermore, for private foundations, only publicly traded securities qualify for the fair-market-
value deduction. Corporate donors, generally subject to the same rules, can deduct up to 10% of gross
income in any one year. An unlimited estate-tax deduction is available for charitable bequests. This
discussion ignores the alternative minimum tax, other rules that affect marginal tax rates, and the estate
tax (whose top rates have sometimes exceeded top income-tax rates).
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Similar logic attends the tax exemption (assuming that tax policy can
effectively identify what should be treated as income and counted as ex-
penses and apply a proper tax rate in the nonprofit context). Again an ex-
ample may be useful. A nonprofit in a hypothetical 35-percent marginal tax
bracket that generates $100 in net taxable income would otherwise pay $35
to Treasury, but the remaining $65 would not have found its way to the
public fisc and would have been private money to be devoted to charitable,
exempt purposes as managed by private nonprofit entities. Moreover, be-
cause an operating charity would often have little or no taxable income, the
tax exemption for foundations and other charities is generally better
thought of only as an exemption on investment income.104
Unless income-tax rates exceed 50 percent for a prolonged period of
time, most of the resources of foundations and other charities will be pri-
vate. 105 Organizations managing mostly private assets for charitable, ex-
empt purposes should not suffer diminished autonomy because a portion of
their assets might otherwise have been paid as taxes. Even if tax rates ex-
ceeded fifty percent, such a narrow application of the quid pro quo ap-
proach risks focusing solely on objective valuation metrics to the exclusion
of the intangible but no less valuable contributions that foundations and
other charities provide to society.
Some public-money advocates acknowledge this weakness by refer-
ring to philanthropic assets as "partially public money." The partially-
public-money argument appears to view the government as being entitled
to influence the purposes, governance, and operations of foundations and
other charities just as would a donor. Of course, donors can restrict the
charitable use of their gifts, as the government does in its capacity as active
grant maker. However, donors--even major donors-are not as donors
endowed by the law with a role in determining the governance of the or-
ganization.
CONCLUSION
Foundations and other charities exist at a critical intersection between
the governmental and business sectors of our political, economic, and so-
cial system. They are dedicated to serving the public through the pursuit of
104. See Daniel Halperin, Does Tax Exemption for Charitable Endowments Subsidize Excessive
Accumulation?, at http://ssrn.com/abstract- 143458 (June 10, 2008).
105. Moreover, policy makers can alter the tax treatment of contributions. For example, the Obama
administration has proposed to cap the tax savings from itemized deductions (including charitable
contributions) at twenty-eight percent; but doing so should not impact on the independence, autonomy,
or privacy of the donee organizations.
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charitable purposes but are created and operate as private, autonomous
organizations. Their accountability is complex in nature and extent, derived
in part from law and in part from the need for legitimacy. This complexity
enables charities to serve as private arenas for the development of the pub-
lic virtues of idealism, inventiveness, 10 6 and civic association; to provide
essential goods and services that are undersupplied by government and the
marketplace; 107 and to offer both an alternative to dependence on govern-
ment and a softening of the rough edges of capitalism.108 It is in this sense
that charities and foundations are "a 'powerful third force,' distinct from
government and business," as one term for the charitable sector-
"independent sector"--suggests.109
We have concluded that based on more than four centuries of law and
policy, foundations and other charities are not inherently public bodies and
their assets are not "public money." As Justice Story warned in Dartmouth
College, each attempt of the legal system to conclude otherwise brings us
closer to government asserting the right to control and direct foundations
and other charities, conflating the government and nonprofit sectors, and
subjecting charitable assets and operations to the "good will and pleasure"
of the persons and prevailing ideas that happen to hold political power at
any particular time. 10
At the same time, abuses within the charitable sector are dangerous to
the general society and culture just as are abuses within the government or
business sector, particularly when the abuse is rampant and pervasive. It is
elemental that foundations' and other charities' purposes may not be pri-
vate and that their assets may not be used for private benefit. Federal and
state laws and regulations are in place to protect against such abuses.
Moreover, it is in the interest of the sector, as well as society as a whole,
that foundations and other charities devote sufficient internal resources to
achieving compliance with these laws and regulations and to detecting,
correcting, and imposing consequences for their violation.
106. K. Martin Worthy, The Tax Reform Act of 1969: Consequences for Private Foundations, 39
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 232, 254 (1975).
107. See generally MARION FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL
AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION (2004); Crimm, supra note 72, at 439; Colombo, supra note 72, at
864-65; Leslie Lenkowsky, In Philanthropy, It's Not Just About the Numbers, CHRONICLE OF
PHILANTHROPY, available at http://www.philanthropy.com/premium/articles/v21/iO7/07OO5501.htm
(Jan. 29, 2009).
108. See CLAIRE GAUDIANI, THE GREATER GOOD: How PHILANTHROPY DRIVES THE AMERICAN
ECONOMY AND CAN SAVE CAPITALISM 14 (2003). See also Schramm, supra note 20, at 368.
109. FLEISHMAN, supra note 67, at 14; See also GAUDIANI, supra note 108, at 23. See the Introduc-
tion, above, regarding the term "independent sector."
110. Dartmouth College, supra note 22, 17 U.S. at 671 (Story, J., concurring).
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Thus, as in other sectors, it can be appropriate to modify applicable
laws, regulations, and enforcement priorities in the charitable sector to
bring clarity and certainty to the law when vagueness causes compliance
problems. It may even be necessary to effect large-scale, revolutionary
reforms when insidious and wide-spread abuses infect the sector and en-
forcement of existing law cannot suffice to restore order and credibility.
However, the consequences of fundamental change in the relationship
between foundations and other charities and government could be signifi-
cant. Such organizations might face increased pressure to accede to strong
feelings or prejudices on the part of prospective grantees, rejected appli-
cants, politicians, or the general public. 111 To judge by the present opera-
tions of the governmental sector, charities might also be expected to place
increased emphasis on their short-term metrics at the expense of long-term
goals. 112 Charities could find that they have fewer incentives to take rea-
sonable, let alone controversial, programmatic risks that government and
business may not responsibly take. If so, we may face the loss of innovative
solutions to social problems.1 13
The most significant harm that could result from a wholesale change
in the traditional relationships is that the philanthropic sector would no
longer be the product of pluralistic choices, freely made, regarding the
expenditure of monetary and human resources. Autonomy has been one of
the defining characteristics of American foundations and other charities;
such entities are free to support and pursue differing and even contrary
programmatic visions, strategies, methods, and structures provided that
111. See FLEISHMAN, supra note 67, at 61-62, 250; DAVID F. FREEMAN & COUNCIL ON
FOUNDATIONS, THE HANDBOOK ON PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS 77 (1991); Bittker, supra note 77, at 342;
Schramm, supra note 20, at 370; Lawrence M. Stone, The Charitable Foundation: Its Governance, 39
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 65 (1975); Homer C. Wordsworth, Private Foundations and the Tax
Reform Act of 1969, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 255, 259 (1975). Some may view a lack of respon-
siveness to public demands as a weakness. However, the philanthropic sector has limited resources,
especially when compared to those of the government or business sector. In addition, foundations-and
other charities-are required to be faithful to donor intent. This responsibility will result in the rejection
of applications by otherwise worthy applicants. More generally, foundations simply cannot responsibly
fund every grant applicant; those that try to do so may find, more often than not, that they have either
abdicated their decision-making responsibilities or impaired their obligations to their charitable pur-
poses. Foundation autonomy helps protect against these inevitable pressures and their potentially harm-
ful consequences.
112. See FLEISHMAN, supra note 67, at 245-48. Bittker, supra note 77, at 342.
113. See 93 Cong. Rec. 33952, 33954 (1974); Advisory Committee, supra note 10, at ii (quoting
John Gardner); FREEMAN, supra note 111, at 6; CURTIS W. MEADOWS, JR., PHILANTHROPIC CHOICE
AND DONOR INTENT: FREEDOM, RESPONSIBILITY AND PUBLIC INTEREST 3 (2002); Bittker, supra note
77, at 342; Stone, supra note 111, at 58, 61 n.9; Wadsworth, supra note 111, at 259. See also Colombo,
Marketing, supra note 67, at 692.
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they do not stray from their mandate to serve charitable purposes. 1 4 Ob-
servers have credited this pluralism with helping to preserve fundamental
American values such as individual choice and initiative; 115 advancing
civilization and promoting general welfare;" t6 multiplying, rather than con-
centrating, sources of power; 117 representing society's preference for rea-
sonable discretion rather than government-imposed uniformity;118
enhancing the vibrancy of our democracy through their capacity to chal-
lenge conventional wisdom;" l9 and allowing charities-particularly, but not
only, religious organizations-freedom to choose their missions and to
make their decisions without government involvement. 120
Clearly, impairing the independence, autonomy and fundamentally
private nature of foundations and other charities could have serious conse-
quences for them, the sector, and broader society, particularly if grounded
on a theory that lacks meaningful support in law, history, or policy. Fortu-
nately, such compromises are not necessary for constructive debate to pro-
ceed on such issues as the direction and role of the independent sector,
donor intent, perpetuity, governing board composition, measuring effec-
tiveness, mission-related investing, and governance best practices. 121 Dis-
cussion of these and other issues informs donors, board members, and
114. See Advisory Committee, supra note 10, at ii. See also Susan Berresford and Lorie Slutsky,
Foundations' Longevity Should be Valued, CHRONICLE OF PHILANTHROPY, available at
http://philanthropy.com/premium/articles/v20/i22/22003101 .htm (Sept. 2, 2008).
115. MEADOWS, supra note 113, at 2 ("As a free people we want the right to live our lives with as
much freedom and individual choice as possible, including the making and selection of philanthropic
and charitable choices"); Colombo, supra note 72, at 865 (quoting Bruce Hopkins' view of exemptions
as a "bulwark against overdomination by government and a hallmark of a free society" and of exempt
organizations as "help[ing] nourish the voluntary sector of this nation and preserve individual initiative,
and reflect[ing] the pluralistic philosophy that has been the guiding spirit of democratic America");
Belknap, supra note 77, at 2025, 2036-37 (quoting NATIONAL PLANNING ASS'N, THE MANUAL OF
CORPORATE GIVING (Beardsley Ruml, in collaboration with Theodore Geiger, ed.)), Ch. 1 (1952), as to
the need for "preserving to the maximum extent possible the decentralized and private character of the
decision-making process in all phases of our national life"); Belknap, supra note 73 at 2036-37 (quot-
ing statement of M.M. Chambers, CHARTERS OF PHILANTHROPIES 2 (1948), that operation of the
voluntary sector "accords with the historic idea of a wide sphere of individual liberties").
116. Belknap, supra note 77, at 2034 (quoting People ex rel. Seminary of Our Lady of Angels v.
Barber, 42 Hun. 27 (1886), aff'd, 13 N.E. 936 (N.Y. 1887)).
117. FLEISHMAN, supra note 67, at 33.
118. Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400, 1406-07 (1998) (stating
society prefers reasonable discretion exercised by different participants under different conditions to the
uniformity of government-directed action).
119. FLEISHMAN, supra note 67, at 56, 250; FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 107, at 2; Lenkowsky,
supra note 107 ("Philanthropy's value goes far beyond its social and economic benefits"); Stone, supra
note I 11, at 66.
120. Sugin, supra note 84, at 435 ("Regardless of whether individual choice is socially desirable, it
is constitutionally significant because it can separate the government's intent from the ultimate recipient
of tax benefits.").
121. See also the American Law Institute's ongoing project on Principles of the Law of Nonprofit
Organizations, for which one of us, Evelyn Brody, is Reporter.
[Vol 85:2
2010] FOUNDA TION AND CHARITY A UTONOMY 617
managers of foundations and other charities and can help these organiza-
tions make decisions that are best for them in their specific circumstances.
However, those debates and conversations deserve an appropriate
framework within which to proceed. By debunking the idea that founda-
tions and other charities and their assets belong to the public at large and
are subject to democratic control, we hope to better focus the current de-
bates and conversations more appropriately on the merits of the underlying
substantive issues without distractions and the false confidence associated
with misapplication of the phrase "public money."

